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INTRODUCTION
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)' envisions a workplace markedly
different from the one that organized labor has long endeavored to construct.
While the statute mandates individualized treatment for disabled employees, or-
ganized labor has traditionally sought to limit the decisionmaking discretion of
employers-and thus their ability to provide such treatment.
The ADA's vision of the workplace is rooted in what the Supreme Court has
identified as the fundamental principle underlying antidiscrimination law in gen-
eral and employment-discrimination law in particular: the notion that everyone
should be treated as an individual. "At the heart of the Constitution's guarantee
of equal protection," the Court has declared, "lies the simple command that the
Government must treat citizens as individuals, not as simply components of a
racial, religious, sexual or national class."' And what the Constitution commands
of government, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19641 commands of private
employers. 4
The ADA shares this commitment to individualized treatment but goes sig-
nificantly further in implementing it. The statute's main ambition, of course, is
to dismantle the barriers that prevent individuals with disabilities from fully in-
tegrating into the workplace (and other domains of society) and thereby to guar-
antee such individuals equal employment (and other) opportunities. 5 To accom-
plish this mission, the ADA indirectly promotes individualized treatment by
1. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C.).
2. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 911 (1995) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted); cf Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 318 (1978) (opinion of
Powell, J.) (holding that, to pass constitutional muster, an affirmative-action pro-
gram in the university-admissions context must "treat[] each applicant as an indi-
vidual in the admissions process").
3. Pub. L. No. 88-352,78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 20ooe-2oooe17
(20o6)).
4. City of L.A. Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 708 (1978) (explaining
that Title VII forbids employers to "treat[] ... individuals as simply components of
a racial, religious, sexual, or national class"); see Kimberly A. Yuracko, Trait Dis-
crimination as Race Discrimination: An Argument About Assimilation, 74 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 365, 434 (2006) (identifying "denying protected group members in-
dividualized treatment" as one of two "traditional forms of status discrimination"
proscribed by Title VII).
5. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5) (2006) ("I ]ndividuals with disabilities continually en-
counter various forms of discrimination, including outright intentional exclusion,
the discriminatory effects of architectural, transportation, and communication bar-
riers, overprotective rules and policies, failure to make modifications to existing
facilities and practices, exclusionary qualification standards and criteria, segrega-
tion, and relegation to lesser services, programs, activities, benefits, jobs, or other
2
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prohibiting employers from making various employment decisions based on an
employee's disability,' just as Title VII prohibits them from making such deci-
sions based on an employee's race or sex. But unlike Title VII, the ADA also di-
rectly mandates individualized treatment for individuals with disabilities by af-
firmatively requiring employers in certain circumstances to "accommodate"
such individuals based on an assessment of each person's unique needs and ca-
pacities, rather than relying on stereotypes about people with disabilities or as-
sumptions about which personal qualities are essential for a given job.7
Whereas the ADA mandates individualized treatment in the workplace, or-
ganized labor has traditionally been wary of such treatment and has sought to
constrain employers' discretion to engage in it. Labor law itself has no ambitions
beyond enabling employees to freely choose whether or not to unionize.' But or-
ganized labor does have more substantive goals, and labor law provides an essen-
tial means of realizing them.
Consider the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 9 which guarantees "the
right of employees to organize" with one another so that they can "bargain col-
lectively" with their employers over "terms and conditions of employment."o
Though an unquestionably important goal, securing these rights by no means
represents organized labor's ultimate aim. Rather, recognizing that "a single em-
ployee [is] helpless in dealing with an employer," the movement has historically
viewed collective action as a means of limiting the power of employers and thus
opportunities .... ); id. § 121o(a)(7) ("[TJhe Nation's proper goals regarding in-
dividuals with disabilities are to assure equality of opportunity, full participation,
independent living, and economic self-sufficiency for such individuals.").
6. Id. § 12112(b)(1).
7. Id. § 12112(b)(5) (A); see Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination, Stigma, and "Disabil-
ity," 86 VA. L. REV. 397, 434 (2000) ("The ADA supplements these universal access
requirements, which aim at removing barriers that impede access by the most nu-
merous classes of people with 'disabilities,' with a general requirement that all peo-
ple with 'disabilities' receive individualized treatment."); Matthew Diller, Judicial
Backlash, the ADA, and the Civil Rights Model, 21 BERKELEY J. EMp. & LAB. L. 19, 47
(2000) (observing that the ADA views "differential and individualized treatment
[als necessary for the establishment of equal opportunity for people with disabili-
ties"); Paul Steven Miller, Disability Civil Rights and a New Paradigm for the Twenty-
First Century: The Expansion of Civil Rights Beyond Race, Gender, and Age, 1 U. PA.
J. LAB. & EMP. L. 511, 526 (1998) (describing the ADA as a "new paradigm of individ-
ualized treatment").
8. Cf Benjamin I. Sachs, Enabling Employee Choice: A Structural Approach to the Rules
of Union Organizing, 123 HARv. L. REV. 655, 658 (2010) ("[L]abor law neither favors
nor disfavors unionization, instead allowing employees to decide which form of
bargaining they prefer. . . .").
9. Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 452 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169
(2006)).
10. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151, 158(d) (2oo6).
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of protecting employees from "arbitrary and unfair treatment."" Only by curtail-
ing such treatment can organized labor realize its more familiar policy objec-
tives-enhanced job security and predictability, higher wages, more generous
benefits, and better working conditions. Organized labor thus regards arbitrary
treatment as the primary threat to employee well-being, and the NLRA equips
employees to counter this threat by augmenting their bargaining power vis-a-vis
their employers."
Organized labor has used this enhanced bargaining power to lobby for work-
place policies that protect employees from arbitrary treatment by cabining em-
ployers' decisionmaking discretion and requiring them to treat all their employ-
ees equally. And yet, employers cannot provide the individual treatment that the
ADA mandates without exercising significant discretion. That is, without the dis-
cretion to depart from or modify generally applicable workplace policies, em-
ployers cannot attend to each employee's unique situation-the central com-
mand of the ADA." The ADA can implement its antidiscrimination norms, then,
only by undermining traditional labor goals. While promising to integrate indi-
viduals with disabilities into the workplace, the ADA threatens to subvert a sig-
nificant source of job security and predictability: generally applicable policies that
constrain employer discretion and thereby guarantee equal, nonarbitrary treat-
ment for all employees.
This result would not be so disconcerting from a labor perspective if employ-
ers could be trusted to exercise their discretion beneficently. But labor has never
been so sanguine, instead regarding employer discretion as a force prone to
abuse. Although employers might exercise their discretion to, say, allow an over-
burdened parent to work from home notwithstanding a general workplace policy
forbidding telecommuting, they might just as readily use their power to reward
complaisant employees and oppress less amenable ones. So it is with the discre-
tion conferred by the ADA. It will often be unclear whether a given employee is
II. NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33 (1937) (citing Am. Steel Found-
ries v. Tri-City Cent. Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184, 209 (1921)).
12. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff, Book Review, 104 HARv. L. REV. 607, 609 (1990) (iden-
tifying as "the critical positive features of unions" both "protecting individuals from
arbitrary treatment and providing the means for their participation in the central
productive activity of their lives"); see also Theodore J. St. Antoine, A Seed Germi-
nates: Unjust Discharge Reform Heads Toward Full Flower, 67 NEB. L. REV. 56, 69
(1988) ("A common assumption . . . is that many unions will not favor legislation
protecting employees against arbitrary treatment by employers because it will elim-
inate or detract from one of the unions' prime selling points in their efforts to or-
ganize the unorganized.").
13. See Miller, supra note 7, at 520 ("The individualized treatment mandated by the
ADA means that employers must exercise judgment in determining how to respond
to a particular applicant or employee."); Robert A. Dubault, Note, The ADA and
the NLRA: Balancing Individual and Collective Rights, 70 IND. L.J. 1271, 1280 (1995)
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entitled to an accommodation under the ADA and, if so, precisely what accom-
modation will be appropriate in the circumstances. Employers will consequently
enjoy significant discretion in responding to accommodation requests, discretion
they can exploit to buy employees' acquiescence and punish dissent just as easily
as they can use it to alleviate employees' burdens. Employers can, in other words,
be more or less accommodating for reasons extrinsic to the ADA itself-indeed,
for wholly illegitimate reasons or for no reason at all. It is this kind of arbitrary
treatment that labor has traditionally attempted to forestall.
By exposing the tension between labor's goal of limiting employer discretion
and the ADA's accommodation requirement, this Article offers a new take on a
perennial debate. Employment-law scholars have long disputed the exact nature
of the ADA's accommodation requirement and, in particular, its relationship to
earlier antidiscrimination mandates. According to one scholarly camp, the re-
quirement radically departs from traditional antidiscrimination norms-not
simply prohibiting employers from deliberately excluding members of a disad-
vantaged social group from the workplace, but also forcing employers to redis-
tribute employment opportunities to those individuals and to bear the costs of
doing so.14 According to another camp, the differences between the ADA's ac-
commodation requirement and traditional antidiscrimination norms are largely
superficial. While the accommodation requirement makes its redistributive mis-
sion explicit, these scholars contend, other antidiscrimination norms-especially
Title VII's "disparate-impact" theory-similarly require employers to bear the
costs of redistributing employment opportunities to members of disadvantaged
social groups."
As this Article shows, neither camp has it quite right. On the one hand, it
seems incontrovertible that the ADA's accommodation requirement and aspects
of Title VII have similar redistributive effects. On the other hand, even if aspects
of Title VII effectively impose accommodation requirements that are function-
ally equivalent to the ADA's, the ADA's accommodation requirement challenges
labor's goal of cabining employer discretion in a way that Title VII does not. Spe-
cifically, in contrast to Title VII, the ADA typically requires employers to make
retail accommodations rather than wholesale ones-to fashion individualized ex-
ceptions to generally applicable workplace policies and practices on a case-by-
case basis rather than to revise the policies and practices for all employees.
(Though, to be sure, this is only a generalization: Title VII mandates some retail
14. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Justin Nelson, Discrimination with a Difference: Can
Employment Discrimination Law Accommodate the Americans with Disabilities Act?,
79 N.C. L. REV. 307, 310-11, 358 nn.21-22 (2001); Pamela S. Karlan & George Ruther-
glen, Disabilities, Discrimination, and Reasonable Accommodation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1, 2-
4, 9 (1996).
15. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, "Rational Discrimination," Accommodation, and the
Politics of (Disability) Civil Rights, 89 VA. L. REV. 825 (2003); Christine JoUs, Antidis-
crimination and Accommodation, 115 HARv. L. REV. 642 (2001); Michael Ashley
Stein, Same Struggle, Different Difference: ADA Accommodations as Antidiscrimina-
tion, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 579 (2004).
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accommodations, while the ADA mandates some wholesale ones.) Although
scholars have previously noted the largely retail nature of the accommodations
mandated by the ADA, 6 they have generally failed to appreciate, as this Article
makes apparent, that such accommodations undermine labor's traditional goal
of constraining employer discretion.17
The tension between labor's goal of limiting employer discretion and the
ADA's accommodation requirement by no means represents the only conflict
between labor law and employment-discrimination law. But to date, labor and
employment-law scholars have been concerned primarily with the effects of em-
ployment-discrimination law on labor's means-that is, the methods it uses to
advance its agenda (namely, collective action).'" This Article, by contrast, consid-
ers how employment-discrimination law affects labor's ends-that is, the sub-
stantive goals it ultimately seeks to achieve (whether or not through collective
action). Foremost among these goals is limiting employers' discretion in order to
prevent them from treating their employees arbitrarily (and thus from under-
mining job security and predictability). This Article examines the ways in which
employment-discrimination law can both advance and impede this goal-how it
can both constrain and augment employer discretion. In doing so, this Article
develops a distinctive analytical framework for understanding the relationship
16. See infra note 104. Indeed, this feature of the ADA is often touted by the statute's
supporters as one of its main virtues. See, e.g., Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 14,
at 3-5.
17. To be sure, labor-law scholars have noted the potential conflicts between the ADA's
accommodation requirement and specific requirements in labor-law statutes, such
as the NLRA's collective-bargaining requirement. See, e.g., Ann C. Hodges, The
Americans with Disabilities Act in the Unionized Workplace, 48 U. MIAMI L. REV. 567
(1994); Jerry M. Hunter, Potential Conflicts Between Obligations Imposed on Employ-
ees and Unions by the National Labor Relations Act and the Americans with Disabil-
ities Act, 13 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 207 (1993); Robert W. Pritchard, Avoiding the Inevita-
ble: Resolving the Conflicts Between the ADA and the NLRA, 11 LAB. LAW. 375 (1995);
Dubault, supra note 13. But beyond these doctrinal tensions, no scholar appears to
have explored in any sustained way the deeper, conceptual conflict between the
ADA's commitment to individualized treatment and labor's overarching goal of
limiting employer discretion.
18. See, e.g., JENNIFER GORDON, SUBURBAN SWEATSHOPS: THE FIGHT FOR IMMIGRANT
RIGHTS 148-84 (2005); Richard A. Bales, The Discord Between Collective Bargaining
and Individual Employment Rights: Theoretical Origins and a Proposed Solution, 77
B.U. L. REV. 687 (1997); James Brudney, Reflections on Group Action and the Law of
the Workplace Symposium: The Changing Workplace, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1563 (1996);
Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of Self-Regulation,
105 COLUM. L. REV. 319 (2005); Benjamin I. Sachs, Employment Law as Labor Law,
29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2685 (2008); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Legacy of Indus-
trial Pluralism: The Tension Between Individual Employment Rights and the New
Deal Collective Bargaining System, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 575 (1992).
6
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between labor law and employment-discrimination law and for addressing spe-
cific controversies arising at the intersection of labor goals and antidiscrimina-
tion norms.
Normatively, this Article suggests that we should reconsider the ADA's com-
mitment to individualized treatment in light of that commitment's costs for labor
goals. To be sure, because labor goals and antidiscrimination norms are incom-
mensurable, it is difficult to imagine a conclusive case for privileging one over the
other, and this Article will not attempt to provide one. Nevertheless, there are
good reasons to reconcile the ADA's accommodation requirement to labor's goal
of limiting employer discretion, rather than vice versa. The most significant is the
different status each principle occupies within the respective movement promot-
ing it. Whereas limiting employer discretion is an essential prerequisite for real-
izing all of labor's ultimate objectives, the ADA's accommodation requirement is
but one means (to be sure, a very effective one) of realizing the disability-rights
movement's goal of providing disabled individuals with equal employment op-
portunities. Labor can no more abjure constraining employer discretion as a pol-
icy objective than it can disclaim promoting job security or augmenting employee
benefits; the former and the latter goals go hand in hand. There are, by contrast,
other ways of providing disabled individuals with employment opportunities, be-
yond the ADA's accommodation requirement, that need not augment employer
discretion-most notably, disparate-impact liability. If such alternatives are
available, and if affording employees individualized treatment necessarily en-
hances the risk of arbitrary treatment and undermines some of the essential pre-
conditions for job security and predictability, then we should reconsider how the
ADA's accommodation requirement attempts to integrate individuals with disa-
bilities into the workplace. At the very least, we should look for ways to limit the
amount of discretion employers must exercise in providing the individual treat-
ment that the ADA mandates. And amid calls by scholars to extend the ADA's
model of individualized treatment to other employment-discrimination statutes,
as well as to workplace regulation more generally, this Article suggests that we
should think twice.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I begins by explaining why one of the
labor movement's central goals has been to curtail the common law rule of "at-
will" employment, according to which employers enjoy nearly absolute discre-
tion to fire an employee at any time and for any reason-and thus have consid-
erable power to treat their employees arbitrarily. It then shows how Title VII
broadly accords with labor's overarching goal of cabining employer discretion.
As Part II demonstrates, the ADA's accommodation requirement conflicts
with this goal. And, notwithstanding a strong scholarly consensus to the contrary,
Part II defends the Supreme Court's decision in US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett'9 as
resolving this conflict in a way that furthers labor goals by encouraging employers
19. 535 U.S. 391 (2002).
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to adopt objective, discretion-constraining workplace policies-which, inci-
dentally, might promote both the ADA's and Title VII's antidiscrimination
norms as well.
Part III applies the framework developed in the previous Parts to a question
that continues to divide the federal courts of appeals: whether the ADA can ever
require an employer to reassign a disabled employee to a particular position in
violation of the employer's policy of filling that position with the most qualified
candidate (a so-called competitive-assignment policy).2 0 This Part argues that an
employer should be allowed to refuse to reassign a disabled employee to a partic-
ular position under its competitive-assignment policy if, but only if, the policy
actually limits the employer's discretion. This will be the case only when the pol-
icy identifies the "most qualified" candidate according to objective, rather than
subjective, criteria."
Finally, the Conclusion briefly considers other contemporary debates that
implicate the conflict between employment-discrimination law's commitment to
individualized treatment and labor's goal of limiting employer discretion. The
Conclusion then identifies the theory of disparate impact as an alternative way of
advancing the former without undermining the latter.
20. Compare EEOC v. United Airlines, Inc., 693 F-3d 760, 764 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding
that the ADA sometimes demands more of employers than simply allowing disa-
bled employees to compete for positions on the same basis with nondisabled em-
ployees); Duvall v. Ga.-Pac. Consumer Prods., L.P., 607 F.3d 1255 (ioth Cir. 2010)
(same); Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154 (ioth Cir. 1999) (en banc)
(same); and Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc)
(same), with Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 486 F.3d 480 (8th Cir. 2007), cert. dis-
missed, 552 U.S. 1136 (2008) (holding that the ADA never requires an employer to
prefer a disabled employee to a more qualified candidate).
21. The distinction between objective and subjective criteria is admittedly vague. In the
context of disparate-impact challenges under Title VII, however, the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission and courts routinely employ the distinction
and have developed distinct standards for each category. See infra Subsection I.B.2;
see also Andrew C. Spiropoulos, Defining the Business Necessity Defense to the Dis-
parate Impact Cause ofAction: Finding the Golden Mean, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1479 (1996).
The idea seems to be that an objective criterion provides a basis for appraising a job
applicant's aptitude or a current employee's performance that is independent of the
employer's personal judgment, whereas a subjective criterion necessarily requires
the employer to exercise judgment in order to apply it. Thus, while the paradig-
matic example of an objective criterion is a mechanically scored multiple-choice
test, the paradigmatic example of a subjective criterion is an interview in which the
employer must form a judgment regarding whether an applicant would be a "good
fit" at the firm. Other employment practices can be arrayed on a spectrum between
these two poles. Insofar as objective criteria provide a more or less mechanical way
of evaluating employees, they limit employer discretion. Note, however, that even
an objective criterion can be "arbitrary" if it bears little or no relation to the job
qualities for which it purports to select. This shows that, although constraining em-
ployer discretion may be necessary for combating arbitrary treatment, it is not suf-
ficient.
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One caveat is in order before turning to these arguments. This Article refers
throughout to "labor goals"-particularly the goal of limiting employer discre-
tion. While the term reflects the central role organized labor has historically
played in curtailing the at-will rule, it should not be taken to suggest that union-
ization and collective bargaining are the only means of restricting employer dis-
cretion. Nor should it be taken to suggest that the tension identified in Part II
between the ADA's accommodation requirement and the goal of limiting em-
ployer discretion arises only in unionized workplaces. Especially since an ever-
shrinking share of the workforce belongs to unions," we should be careful not to
overlook the myriad ways in which employees have managed to limit employer
discretion even without the advantages of unionization-and thus the myriad
ways in which antidiscrimination norms can conflict with labor goals even in
nonunionized workplaces. Accordingly, while this Article takes as the paradig-
matic cases of discretion-constraining policies those enshrined in collective-bar-
gaining agreements, its conclusions ultimately apply with equal force to all work-
place policies that genuinely cabin employer discretion. Put another way (and to
repeat), this Article is concerned with labor's traditional ends, whether or not
they are realized through labor's traditional means.
I. LABOR GOALS AND TITLE VII
The tension between employment-discrimination law's commitment to in-
dividualized treatment and labor's goal of constraining employer discretion is
not inevitable. On the contrary, both the "disparate-treatment" and "disparate-
impact" theories of liability under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 are
structured in a way that at least avoids enhancing employer discretion and that
may even help to constrain it. Before confirming Title VII's consistency with la-
bor goals, however, those goals must be articulated more precisely. Section L.A
argues that we can understand the labor movement primarily as a response to the
common law rule of "at-will" employment and the arbitrary treatment to which
the rule renders employees vulnerable. As labor sees it, by limiting employer dis-
cretion, policies such as "for-cause" termination and seniority rights help to curb
arbitrary treatment and promote fairness in the workplace. This, in turn, estab-
lishes an essential precondition for the realization of labor's ultimate goals:
greater job security and predictability, higher wages, better working conditions,
22. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, UNION MEMBERS-2012, at tbl.3 (2013),
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf (finding that only 11.3% of work-
ers belonged to a union in 2012, with public-sector workers having a union-mem-
bership rate of 35.9% and private-sector workers having a rate of only 6.6%); Steven
Greenhouse, Share of the Work Force in a Union Falls to a 97-Year Low, 11.3%,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/o1/24/business/union-
membership-drops-despite-job-growth .html?ref=stevengreenhouse&_r=o.
23. This Article thus differs from previous scholarship considering the narrower, doc-
trinal question of how the ADA applies in unionized workplaces. See sources cited
supra note 17.
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and so on. Section I.B then shows how Title VII avoids augmenting employer
discretion, advancing its antidiscrimination norms without subverting labor
goals.
A. "At- Will" Employment, Employer Discretion, and Labor Goals
In seeking greater job security, higher wages, and better working conditions
for employees, labor has had to surmount a formidable hurdle: the common law
rule of "at-will" employment. According to what is reputed to be the original
statement of the rule in American law, "a general or indefinite hiring is prima
facie a hiring at will .... [Ilt is an indefinite hiring and is determinable at the will
of either party. . . ."2 What the rule means in practice is that, barring an agree-
ment to the contrary, employers "may dismiss their employe[e]s at will . . . for
good cause, for no cause or even for cause morally wrong, without being thereby
guilty of legal wrong." 5 A corollary of the laissez-faire principle of freedom of
contract, the at-will rule confers nearly unfettered decisionmaking discretion on
employers.
The at-will rule has traditionally been criticized for granting employers des-
potic power over their employees. For example, dissenting from an early state-
court decision endorsing the rule, one judge lamented that it would permit an
employer to fire an employee "solely for the purpose of injury to another, or hold
the threat over the employe[e] in terrorem to fetter the freedom of the em-
ploye[e], and for the purpose of injuring an obnoxious party."" The employee
would thus feel compelled to obey his employer's every command, however un-
reasonable, lest he incur "the wrath of [his] employer by dismissal from ser-
vice." 7 According to a more recent state court decision, because it completely
subjects employees to the predilections of their employers, the at-will rule is fun-
damentally incompatible with "the single most important objective of the work-
force: job security"-that is, "the assurance that one's livelihood, one's family's
future, will not be destroyed arbitrarily."'
24. H.G. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT §134, at 272 (Albany,
N.Y., J.D. Parsons, Jr. 1877). For one account of the historical development of the
at-will rule in American law, including the role played by Wood's treatise, see Jay
M. Feinman, The Development of theEmployment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.
118 (1976).
25. Payne v. W. & Atl. R.R. Co., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884), overruled on other grounds
by Hutton v. Watters, 179 S.W. 134 (Tenn. 1915).
26. Id. at 542 (Freeman, J., dissenting).
27. Id. at 543-44.
28. Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, 1266 (N.J. 1985) (holding that
an employment manual's terms could displace the usual presumption of at-will
employment). Defenders of the at-will rule typically respond to such charges by
denying the premise that the doctrine affords employers unbridled discretion. In a
free labor market, they contend, an employer will be unable to assemble and retain
10
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Organized labor and its allies have picked up on these themes. Early advo-
cates of unionization, for instance, compared employer/employee relations un-
der the at-will rule to a "dictatorship" and contrasted them with the self-rule of
democracy. 9 Some contemporary scholars of the labor movement contend that
the rule compromises employees' "freedom" by rendering them wholly "depend-
ent" on their employers30 and that it turns the employment relationship into "a
dominant-servient relation rather than one of mutual rights and obligations."'
The various critics of the at-will rule all sound the same refrain: the rule
grants employers the power to treat their employees "arbitrarily"-that is, based
purely on their whim, rather than on those of an employee's characteristics that
bear on her ability to perform the job. There are myriad reasons to condemn such
treatment. For one thing, it can involve outright cruelty, as when an employer
fires an employee or assigns her especially undesirable work tasks simply from
spite." But even when arbitrary treatment is not so malicious, it can nevertheless
offend fundamental moral principles, such as political freedom" and social
a sufficient workforce-and thus to achieve her economic objectives-if she ac-
quires a reputation for arbitrarily firing or otherwise mistreating her employees.
See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV.
947, 967-68 (1984). This response, however, assumes that employees have complete
information-particularly concerning the legal regime governing the employment
relationship. And yet, many studies show that employees generally overestimate
their legal rights under an at-will regime. See, e.g., Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining with
Imperfect Information: A Study of Worker Perceptions of Legal Protection in an At-
Will World, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 105, 126-146 (1997).
29. Robert F. Wagner, The Ideal Industrial State-As Wagner Sees It, N.Y. TIMES, May
9,1937, § SM8 (Magazine), at 23 ("Let men become the servile pawns of their mas-
ters in the factories of the land and there will be destroyed the bone and sinew of
resistance to political dictatorship.... But let men know the dignity of freedom and
self-expression in their daily lives, and they will never bow to tyranny in any quarter
of their national life.").
30. Lawrence E. Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the
Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1404 (1967).
31. Clyde W. Summers, Employment at Will in the United States: The Divine Right of
Employers, 3 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 65, 78 (2000); see id. at 68 ("[Tjhe premises of
the [at-will rule] are quite clear; the employer has sovereignty except to the extent
it has expressly granted its employees rights. The doctrine thus expresses and im-
plements the subordination of workers to those who control the enterprise....
Their terms and conditions of employment can be changed in any way at any time
and they can be dismissed without reason and without notice.").
32. Cf Rachel Arnow-Richman, Just Notice: Re-Reforming Employment at Will, 58
UCLA L. REV. 1, 10 (2010) ("Consistent with their exploitation critique, these advo-
cates presented at-will employment as enabling arbitrary, malicious, and even so-
cially harmful employer behavior.").
33. According to the most prominent contemporary exposition of the classical repub-
lican theory of freedom-as-"nondomination," one person dominates another-
and thus renders her unfree-insofar as he (1) possesses "the capacity to interfere"
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equality. 4 And if an employer frequently makes important employment deci-
sions purely from whim, or if she institutes policies that utilize opaque or arbi-
trary criteria, she will sow uncertainty among her employees, preventing them
from forming stable expectations regarding their employment.35
The surest way to prevent employers from treating their employees arbitrar-
ily-and thus from subjecting their employees to these undesirable conse-
quences-is to limit the at-will rule and the significant discretion it affords em-
ployers. Because the at-will rule is the default common law rule governing
employer/employee relationships, 6 employees who do not belong to unions
must generally rely on other common law doctrines or statutory protections to
avoid the rule's application in particular cases. Fortunately for such employees,
state courts and legislatures have developed a number of doctrines that displace
the at-will rule in certain circumstances and limit employer discretion. 37 Each of
these doctrines, however, is typically only as strong as the particular factual cir-
cumstances of the individual employee invoking it. Whether an employee hand-
book imposes binding obligations on an employer, for example, depends on the
(2) "on an arbitrary basis" (that is, "at his pleasure" and "without reference to the
interests, or the opinions" of the other person) (3) in the other's "choices." PHILIP
PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT 52,55,62 (1997).
As the traditional criticisms of the at-will rule make clear, the rule grants employers
such dominating power over their employees-regardless of whether they exercise
that power on any particular occasion.
34. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Employment Law and Social Equality, 112 MICH. L. REV.
225, 231-36 (2013).
35. This will be especially true in an age where " [f]lexibility and mobility ... have re-
placed predictability and stability as core values in business organization." Jim
Pope, Next Wave Organizing and the Shift to a New Paradigm of Labor Law, So
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 515, 516 (20o6).
36. See Lisa J. Bernt, Finding the Right Jobs for the Reasonable Person in Employment
Law, 77 UMKC L. REV. 1, 7 (20o8); Mayer G. Freed & Daniel D. Polsby, Just Cause
for Termination Rules and Economic Efficiency, 38 EMORY L.J. 1097, 1097 (1989).
37. See, e.g., Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (Ct. App. 1981) (noting a
variety of facts from which the jury could find for-cause protections to be "implied
in fact," including a course of dealing between an employer and its employees and
the employer's acknowledged policies); Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 427
A.2d 385, 387 (Conn. 1980) ("[P]ublic policy imposes some limits on unbridled dis-
cretion to terminate the employment of someone hired at will."); Fortune v. Nat'l
Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1256 (Mass. 1977) (finding an employment con-
tract to contain an "implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing" that prohibits
especially arbitrary treatment); Woolley v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 491 A.2d 1257,
1258 (N.J. 1985) (treating an employee-handbook provision permitting employers
to fire their employees only for "cause" as contractually binding).
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handbook's particular terms, how the handbook was promulgated to the employ-
ees, and so on."8 Each doctrine therefore promises only patchwork protection
against arbitrary treatment.
Unionized workers, by contrast, have a potentially more robust weapon in
their arsenal: the NLRA and its requirement that the employers of unionized
workers "bargain collectively" with unions over "terms and conditions of em-
ployment." 9 Unlike the common law and statutory doctrines available to non-
unionized workers, this requirement protects unionized workers from arbitrary
treatment regardless of the facts of their individual relationships with their em-
ployers. To be sure, any protection afforded by collective-bargaining rights is in-
direct: rather than impose specific substantive constraints on employers' discre-
tion, the NLRA empowers unionized employees to negotiate on a more equal
footing with their employers. 4o But organized labor has used its collective-bar-
gaining power to induce employers to accept meaningful limits on their discre-
tion.4' Most significant, "collective-bargaining agreements" almost always in-
clude "for-cause" provisions, which permit employers to fire employees only for
legitimate reasons. 42 They also typically require that, before firing an employee,
an employer afford her the protections of "industrial due process," including no-
tice of the charges against her, a hearing at which she can attempt to rebut those
charges, and an ultimate decision based on the merits of her individual case yet
consistent with the dispositions of similar cases.43 Faced with these formidable
constraints on their discretion, employers have less opportunity to subject their
employees to the kind of arbitrary treatment that can characterize the employ-
ment relationship under the at-will rule.
38. See, e.g., Woolley, 491 A.2d 1257.
39. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (20o6).
40. See Bales, supra note 18, at 746-47.
41. To note the victories labor has achieved through collective bargaining is by no
means to deny the NLRA's shortcomings. Indeed, according to most labor-law
scholars, the NLRA has failed to adequately facilitate organizing and collective bar-
gaining and to adapt to changes in the modern workplace and labor market. See,
e.g., KATHERINE V.W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT REGULATION
FOR THE CHANGING WORKPLACE (2004); Cynthia Estlund, The Ossification ofAmer-
ican Labor Law, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 1527 (2002); Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Se-
curing Workers' Rights to Self-Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769
(1983). But even if the NLRA falls short of some ideal measure, it still affords un-
ionized employees more protection than they would enjoy under the at-will rule.
42. See EDWIN BEAL, EDWARD WICKERSHAM & PHILIP KIENAS, THE PRACTICE OF
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 259-60 (4TH ed. 1972).
43. See Roger I. Abrams & Dennis R. Nolan, Toward a Theory of "Just Cause" in Em-
ployee Discipline Cases, 1985 DUKE L.J. 594, 611-12; Cynthia L. Estlund, Free Speech
and Due Process in the Workplace, 71 IND. L.J. iol, 136-38 (1995).
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Many collective-bargaining agreements further limit employer discretion by
instituting seniority systems, which "allot[] to employees ever improving em-
ployment rights and benefits as their relative lengths of pertinent employment
increase."4 Proponents adduce many justifications for seniority systems, includ-
ing respecting employees' reliance interests,4 5 rewarding employees' "faithful ser-
vice,"46 and inducing employees to invest in the creation of "firm-specific human
capital."47 All of these benefits, however, supervene on one essential feature of
seniority systems: their guarantee of nearly absolute job security against employer
caprice. Especially when an employer must lay off some of its employees because
of an economic downturn or technological change (and thus need not show
"cause" for any particular termination decision),* seniority systems "militate
against personal retaliation or preference."4 9 More generally, within the limits of
"sufficient-ability" clauses (also called "relative-ability" clauses),"o seniority sys-
tems require employers to make job-assignment, pay, and promotion decisions
based solely on objective calculations of job tenure rather than more subjective
criteria." Because they constrain employer discretion so significantly, seniority
systems are a paradigmatic safeguard against arbitrary treatment 52 -and a para-
digmatic departure from the at-will rule.
44. Cal. Brewers Ass'n v. Bryant, 444 U.S. 598, 605 (1980).
45. See PAUL C. WElLER, GOVERNING THE WORKPLACE: THE FUTURE OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT LAW 66-67 (1990).
46. Caroline Poplin, Fair Employment in a Depressed Economy: The Layoff Problem, 23
UCLA L. REV. 177, 196-97 (1975).
47. Margaret M. Blair, Firm-Specific Human Capital and Theories of the Firm, in
EMPLOYEES AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 58, 75 (Margaret M. Blair & Mark J. Roe
eds., 1999).
48. See Benjamin Aaron, Reflections on the Legal Nature and Enforceability of Seniority
Rights, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1532, 1535 (1962) ("More than any other provision of the
collective agreement, . . . seniority affects the economic security of the individual
employee covered by its terms. In industries characterized by a steady reduction in
total employment the employee's length of service is his principal protection
against the loss of his job.").
49. FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA ASPER ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 808 (Marlin M.
Volz & Edward P. Goggin eds., 5th ed. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted).
50. Under a sufficient-ability clause, an employer must favor a more senior employee
over a more junior one for a position only if the senior employee can perform the
position at least as well as the junior one. See id. at 844.
51. See Susan Gardner & James F. Morgan, The Supreme Court to Decide: Seniority
Rights or Reasonable Accommodation Under the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA), 52 LAB. L.J. 234, 235 (2001) (arguing that "the length of time an employee is
associated with a particular company, division, or position provides a fair, objective
alternative criterion for making" employment decisions).
52. See Frances Lee Ansley, Stirring the Ashes: Race, Class and the Future of Civil Rights
Scholarship, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 993, io6 n.74 (1989) ("Competitive seniority is a
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Organized labor, of course, does not seek to eliminate all employer discre-
tion. It recognizes the quixotic nature of such a quest, as well as the fact that dis-
cretion can be used to benefit, as well as harm, employees. But it also recognizes
that discretion is especially likely to be abused-and especially likely to be harm-
ful-in certain core domains of employer decisionmaking, such as hiring and
firing employees, making job assignments and promotions, and setting wages.
The National Labor Relations Act accordingly treats these domains as "manda-
tory" subjects of collective bargaining, in that employers may not set policies re-
garding them unilaterally, but rather must negotiate over them with employees'
union representatives. 3 By focusing on particularly high-stakes employer deci-
sions, organized labor can protect employees from the most consequential forms
of mistreatment without dissipating its attention and resources trying to prevent
every minor misfortune an employer might visit on her employee.
In promoting seniority systems and the other worker protections typically
enshrined in collective-bargaining agreements, labor unions do not regard curb-
ing employer discretion as their ultimate objective or something to be pursued
for its own sake. Rather, unions' professed ultimate objective is to improve the
lot of workers-to guarantee them a degree of job security and predictability,
raise their wages, enhance their benefits, and ameliorate their working condi-
tions. Constraining employer discretion is by no means sufficient to achieve these
goals. For example, although promoting predictability and reducing uncertainty
for workers is one of labor's cardinal aims,5 4 unions cannot eliminate all sources
hard-fought and much-prized achievement of the labor movement. It serves as a
bulwark against employer favoritism, protecting individuals against arbitrary treat-
ment, and also protecting their ability to organize collectively."); Carl Gersuny, Or-
igins of Seniority Provisions in Collective Bargaining, 33 LAB. L.J. 518, 519 (1982) (ar-
guing that " [s] eniority is germane to due process because its implementation serves
to restrict management's capacity for applying arbitrary and capricious criteria in
making invidious distinctions among employees").
53. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (20o6) (requiring employers to bargain collectively with the
representatives of unionized workers "with respect to wages, hours, and other terms
and conditions of employment"); id. § 159(a) (referring to "rates of pay, wages,
hours of employment, or other conditions of employment"). The Supreme Court
has viewed these provisions as outlining only the broad contours of the mandatory-
bargaining terrain. See NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342,
349 (1958). The National Labor Relations Board bears responsibility for filling in
the regulatory landscape, based partly on the practices of particular industries. See
Ford Motor Co. v. NLRB, 441 U.S. 488, 496 (1979). Both the NLRB and the lower
courts have now had the opportunity to classify myriad employer policies as either
"mandatory" or "permissive" subjects of collective bargaining. See i THE
DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 1263-1362 (John E. Higgins, Jr. et al., eds., 5th ed. 2006).
54. Cf Arnow-Richman, supra note 32, at 27-28 ("Most collective bargaining agree-
ments create a process for selecting workers for layoff ('last in, first out') and pro-
vide affected workers with recall and transfer rights. They thus offer workers a mod-
est degree of predictability about job loss.").
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of uncertainty simply by limiting employer discretion; economic recessions, in-
dustrial dislocations, and corporate mergers can all upend employees' most set-
tled expectations.
But while limiting employer discretion may not be sufficient for achieving
labor's ultimate objectives, it is undoubtedly necessary. We need only consider
the employment relationship under the at-will rule to realize that, insofar as em-
ployers enjoy significant discretion in setting workplace policies, they can thwart
employees' expectations, depress their wages, curtail their benefits, and neglect
their working conditions with relative impunity-especially when the market in
which an employer operates is less than fully competitive. Though organized la-
bor obviously has ambitions beyond constraining employer discretion, that im-
perative remains a necessary prerequisite for achieving all of the movement's
other objectives, and thus an essential labor goal in its own right.55
B. Title VII's Consistency with Labor Goals
Given its considerable victories over the at-will rule and arbitrary treatment
in the workplace, we would expect labor to oppose policies that significantly en-
hance employer discretion. As this Section will show, labor has had little to fear
from Title VII, which has managed to implement its commitment to individual-
ized treatment without augmenting employer discretion in the process.5' To be
sure, Title VII's antidiscrimination norms are both narrower and broader than
the labor goals enshrined in the for-cause, due process, and seniority provisions
of collective-bargaining agreements. They are narrower because they stop well
short of imposing a genuine for-cause requirement, permitting employers to hire
and fire employees for even the most arbitrary reasons, just not for certain dis-
criminatory ones. They are broader because they proscribe some forms of dis-
crimination that cannot be fairly described as arbitrary treatment, such as the
"rational" use of accurate race- and sex-based stereotypes. Nevertheless, insofar
55. Cf Anthony Herman, Wrongful Discharge Actions After Lueck and Metropolitan
Life Insurance: The Erosion of Individual Rights and Collective Strength?, 9 INDUS.
REL. L.J. 596, 601 n.18 (1987) (" [T]he only immediate benefit that unions legitimately
can offer in organizing campaigns is the end to discriminatory and arbitrary treat-
ment, generally improved working conditions, protection against unjust termina-
tion, and a measure of participation in workplace decisionmaking, viz., industrial
democracy. In the long term, unions legitimately can promise improved wage and
benefit levels, provided that a greater percentage of workers opt for unionization.").
56. Indeed, in some respects, Title VII goes out of its way to protect the achievements
of the labor movement-even at significant cost to its own objectives. Most nota-
bly, even as the statute subjects unions to the same basic prohibitions of discrimi-
nation that employers must heed, see 42 U.S.C. § 20ooe-2(C) (2006), it insulates
seniority systems-as we have seen, one of the labor movement's signal contribu-
tions-from disparate-impact challenges. See id. § 200oe-2(h); Int'l Bhd. of Team-
sters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324,353-54 (1977) (holding that "an otherwise neutral,
legitimate seniority system does not become unlawful under Title VII simply be-
cause it may perpetuate pre-Act discrimination").
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as it constrains, rather than amplifies, employer discretion, Title VII promotes its
antidiscrimination norms without impeding traditional labor goals."
1. Disparate Treatment
Title VII's prohibition of "disparate-treatment" discrimination is broadly
consistent with labor's goal of limiting employer discretion, even if it does rela-
tively little to actually further that aim. An employer commits disparate-treat-
ment discrimination when he "simply treats some people less favorably than oth-
ers because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Proof of
discriminatory motive is critical . . . ."5' By proscribing such conduct, Title VII
indirectly promotes individualized treatment, forbidding employers to base em-
ployment decisions on generalizations about the members of certain social
groups to which employees belong (which, in turn, directs employers' attention
to employees' other, more distinctive qualities).59
At first glance, this aspect of Title VII might seem to increase the risk of arbi-
trary treatment in the workplace. For if employers may no longer rely on certain
generalizations, then they might instead judge employees based on individual
traits that have no bearing on job performance-that is, arbitrarily. On this view,
the ideal of individualized treatment is in tension with labor's attempt to guar-
antee equal, nonarbitrary treatment for all employees. The concern, however, is
misplaced. Regardless of whether the prohibition of disparate treatment encour-
ages employers to focus more on employees' individual qualities, it does not grant
57. This is not to suggest that the converse is also true-that the labor movement pro-
motes its goals without undermining antidiscrimination norms. On the contrary,
in some socioeconomic conditions, policies designed to protect job security can
harm the employment opportunities of the very socially marginalized groups that
employment-discrimination law seeks to protect. See Julie C. Suk, Discrimination
at Will: Job Security Protections and Equal Employment Opportunity in Conflict, 60
STAN. L. REV. 73 (2007).
58. Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 335 n-15.
59. Notwithstanding its frequent deployment by courts, see supra notes 2-4 and accom-
panying text, the notion of treating someone as an individual is notoriously slip-
pery. For one thing, as a number of commentators have observed, we think it per-
fectly permissible (and even necessary) in many contexts to judge people based on
generalizations and other heuristics. See, e.g., Kasper Lippert-Rasmussen, "We Are
All Different": Statistical Discrimination and the Right to Be Treated as an Individual,
15 J. ETHICS47 (2011). But for purposes of this Article, it is enough to note that, when
courts invoke the ideal of individualized treatment, they seem to have in mind
something along the lines suggested in the main text: regarding a person as a unique
individual with her own distinctive traits rather than simply as a fungible member
of a particular social group. See, e.g., Kiyoko Kamio Knapp, Don't Awaken the Sleep-
ing Child: Japan's Gender Equality Law and the Rhetoric of Gradualism, 8 COLUM. J.
GENDER & L. 143, 186 (1999) (describing as "the core principle of Title VII" the no-
tion that "[i]t is unfair to exclude the whole category of one gender without a case-
by-case evaluation of an individual job applicant").
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them any more discretion to act on their assessments of those qualities than they
would have in the absence of Title VII. That is, it does not augment employer
discretion beyond the baseline level. If, for instance, an employer is subject only
to the at-will rule, Title VII will in no way enhance her already considerable dis-
cretion to treat employees arbitrarily based on their individual characteristics. If,
by contrast, an employer is bound by a workplace policy that constrains her dis-
cretion in awarding promotions (say, a seniority system), she will not have to
modify or depart from that policy in order to comply with the prohibition of
disparate treatment; the policy will continue to be just as constraining as before.
Not only does the prohibition of disparate treatment avoid increasing em-
ployer discretion, but it may even limit such discretion by precluding certain
grounds on which employers might otherwise base employment decisions. To be
sure, the ban by no means imposes a for-cause requirement on employers, since
it "does not purport to limit the other qualities and characteristics that employers
may take into account in making employment decisions.""o But the Supreme
Court overstated the point when it declared Title VII "[tihe converse ... of 'for
cause' legislation."" On the contrary, Title VII resembles for-cause requirements
insofar as it proscribes certain bases of decision and thus constrains employer
discretion; it differs from such requirements in proscribing only a limited num-
ber of illegitimate bases of decision, rather than every illegitimate basis-an ad-
mittedly significant difference, but one of degree rather than kind.
All that said, given the method for proving disparate treatment, Title VII's
ban on the conduct ends up constraining employer discretion less in practice
than it might initially seem to promise. In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,"
the Supreme Court articulated a burden-shifting framework for adjudicating dis-
parate-treatment claims. To meet his "initial burden . . . of establishing a prima
facie case of ... discrimination" under this framework," a plaintiff who alleges
that he was rejected for a job because of a protected characteristic will typically
have to "demonstrate at least that his rejection did not result from the two most
common legitimate reasons on which an employer might rely to reject a job ap-
plicant: an absolute or relative lack of qualifications or the absence of a vacancy
in the job sought."6 4 By eliminating these two reasons as possible explanations
for his rejection, the plaintiff justifies an inference, rebuttable by the defendant,
that he was rejected for a discriminatory reason." Drawing this inference from
6o. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 239 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil
Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2oooe-2(a).
61. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 239 (emphasis added).
62. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
63. Id. at 802.
64. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 358 n.44 (1977).
65. Id.; see also Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981) ("Estab-
lishment of the prima facie case in effect creates presumption that the employer
unlawfully discriminated against the employee.").
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the plaintiffs prima facie case is in tension with the at-will rule, which contem-
plates an expansive range of reasons, both legitimate and illegitimate, on which
an employer might base a given employment decision. Indeed, the Court has jus-
tified this inference based on the dichotomous assumption that employers usu-
ally act either for cause or for discriminatory motives.66 Whether or not this as-
sumption is empirically sound, it departs from the presuppositions of the at-will
rule.
Practically, however, the other steps of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shift-
ing framework prevent Title VII's prohibition of disparate treatment from be-
coming a genuine for-cause requirement. The defendant can rebut the plaintiffs
prima facie case simply by articulating a nondiscriminatory reason-however ca-
pricious or irrational-for the challenged employment decision."7 This low hur-
dle reflects the main premise of employment at will-to wit, that employers may
fire or take other adverse action against their employees for any reason or no
reason at all." And though the burden then reverts to the plaintiff to show the
66. See Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978) ("A prima facie case
under McDonnell Douglas raises an inference of discrimination only because we
presume these acts, if otherwise unexplained, are more likely than not based on the
consideration of impermissible factors. And we are willing to presume this largely
because we know from our experience that more often than not people do not act
in a totally arbitrary manner, without any underlying reasons, especially in a busi-
ness setting. Thus, when all legitimate reasons for rejecting an applicant have been
eliminated as possible reasons for the employer's actions, it is more likely than not
the employer, who we generally assume acts only with some reason, based his deci-
sion on an impermissible consideration such as race." (citation omitted)).
67. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802-03; see, e.g., Forrester v. Rauland-Borg Corp.,
453 F.3d 416, 418 (7th Cir. 2006) (" [T]he question is never whether the employer
was mistaken, cruel, unethical, out of his head, or downright irrational in taking
the action for the stated reason, but simply whether the stated reason was his rea-
son: not a good reason, but the true reason."); cf Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768
(1995) (per curiam) (invoking the McDonnell Douglas framework to hold that "im-
plausible," "silly," "fantastic," and "superstitious" explanations can rebut a prima
facie case of discriminatory use of peremptory challenges by a prosecutor).
But note that, however arbitrary, the employer's professed reason must have
some evidentiary basis, such that it creates a genuine issue of material fact as to
whether the employer actually discriminated. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254-55. The
employer's reason must also be sufficiently specific. See, e.g., ladimarco v. Runyon,
190 F.3d 151, 166-67 (3d Cir. 1999) (holding that defendant's assertion that the suc-
cessful candidate was simply "the right person for the job" was "not a race-neutral
explanation at all, and allowing it to suffice to rebut a prima facie case of discrimi-
natory animus is tantamount to a judicial repeal of the very protections Congress
intended under Title VII").
68. It is for precisely this reason that many scholars argue that the at-will rule makes it
so hard for discrimination plaintiffs to prevail that it virtually vitiates Title VII's
protections. See, e.g., William R. Corbett, The "Fall" ofSummers, the Rise of "Pretext
Plus," and the Escalating Subordination of Federal Employment Discrimination Law
to Employment at Will: Lessons from McKennon and Hicks, 30 GA. L. REV. 305
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defendant's asserted nondiscriminatory reason to be a mere "pretext,"'9 this op-
portunity proves to be a very limited one.7 o By making it relatively difficult for
discrimination plaintiffs to carry their ultimate burden of proof, these practical
features of Title VII litigation preserve a significant realm of employer discretion,
though not quite so expansive a realm as afforded by the at-will rule.
Even as it balks at imposing a genuine for-cause requirement, Title VII's pro-
hibition of disparate treatment also goes beyond the traditional labor goal of lim-
iting employer discretion in order to curb arbitrary treatment, proscribing cer-
tain employment practices that cannot be fairly described as arbitrary. Most
notably, the Court has interpreted the statute to prohibit employers from relying
on even accurate race- and sex-based stereotypes, 7' which many scholars believe
can sometimes promote business efficiency.72 This rule reflects the obvious fact
(1996); Chad Derum & Karen Engle, The Rise of the Personal Animosity Presumption
in Title VII and the Return to "No Cause" Employment, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1177 (2003);
Ann C. McGinley, Rethinking Civil Rights and Employment at Will: Toward a Co-
herent National Discharge Policy, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1443 (1996); Donna E. Young, Ra-
cial Releases, Involuntary Separations, and Employment At-Will, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV.
351(2001).
69. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804-05.
70. This is so for at least three reasons. First, courts generally accept even suspect rea-
sons, such as "personal animosity," as nonpretextual. See Derum & Engle, supra
note 68, at 1182 (arguing that courts' focus on personal animosity as the source of
interpersonal conflict at work reflects "an ideological commitment to employment
at will"); Ann C. McGinley, The Emerging Cronyism Defense and Affirmative Action:
A Critical Perspective on the Distinction Between Colorblind and Race-Conscious De-
cision Making Under Title VII, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 1003, 1016, 1020 (1997). Second, to
count as pretext, an employer's proffered reason must be not only false, but delib-
erately so-an outright lie rather than an honest mistake. See, e.g., Forrester, 453
F.3d at 419 ("A pretext ... is a deliberate falsehood. An honest mistake, however
dumb, is not. . . ." (citations omitted)); Johnson v. AT&T Corp., 422 F.3d 756, 762
(8th Cir. 2005). Third, even if the plaintiff manages to show the defendant's asserted
reason to be a pretext, such a showing typically permits the jury to conclude that
the defendant unlawfully discriminated but never compels it to do so; the plaintiff
still retains the ultimate burden of proving that the defendant discriminated against
her, which means showing that the defendant did in fact base its decision on one of
the characteristics that Title VII proscribes. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods.,
Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 146-48 (2000); St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511
(1993).
71. See L.A. Dep't of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 708 (1978).
72. See Stewart Schwab, Is Statistical Discrimination Efficient?, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 228
(1986); David A. Strauss, The Law and Economics of Racial Discrimination in Em-
ployment: The Case for Numerical Standards, 79 GEO. L.J. 1619, 1628 (1991). But see
Samuel Issacharoff, Contractual Liberties in Discriminatory Markets, 70 TEX. L. REV.
1219, 1223 (1992) (arguing that, while statistical discrimination might be efficient in
the short run, it is inefficient in the long run because it creates "disincentives for
optimal acquisition of human capital").
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that Title VII's paramount purpose is combating discrimination, not curtailing
all arbitrary treatment. And yet, the former goal is undoubtedly consistent with
the latter, for, as we have seen, excluding certain considerations from employer
decisionmaking in no way enhances employer discretion and may even curb it.
In these respects, the antidiscrimination norms embodied in Title VII's prohibi-
tion of disparate treatment broadly accord with labor's goal of limiting employer
discretion."
2. Disparate Impact
The other primary basis for liability under Title VII-so-called disparate-
impact liability-is even more congenial to labor's traditional goal of limiting
employer discretion. Indeed, whereas the prohibition of disparate treatment
seems in practice merely to avoid augmenting employer discretion, the prohibi-
tion of disparate impact actually restricts such discretion by proscribing certain
arbitrary employment practices outright.
Unlike claims of disparate treatment, claims of disparate impact do not allege
that an employer acted with discriminatory intent, but rather "involve employ-
ment practices that are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but
that in fact fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified
by business necessity." 4 To make out a claim of disparate impact under Title VII,
then, a plaintiff must show that a facially neutral employment practice has a dis-
proportionate adverse impact on the members of a group who share a particular
protected characteristic. 5 The burden then shifts to the employer to defend the
employment practice as "job related for the position in question and consistent
with business necessity."76 Because of this "business-necessity" defense, Title
73. This Subsection has ignored another way of establishing disparate- treatment liabil-
ity under Title VII: the "mixed-motives" theory. An employer is liable under this
theory whenever a protected trait "was a motivating factor for any employment
practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice." 42 U.S.C. § 20ooe-
2(m) (20o6). An employer, can, however, avoid liability for damages if he shows he
would have taken the same action anyway. Id. § 20ooe-5(g)(2)(B). For purposes of
this Article, it is enough to note that the mixed-motives theory cabins employer
discretion even more significantly than the McDonnell Douglas framework, holding
employers liable whenever a protected trait was a "motivating factor" for their de-
cision, even if it did not amount to a "but for" cause of that decision.
74. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n-15 (1977).
75. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).
76. Id. Technically, if the employer meets its burden of showing the challenged em-
ployment practice to be "job related" and "consistent with business necessity," the
plaintiff still has an opportunity to identify some "alternative employment prac-
tice" that would similarly achieve the employer's objectives without producing a
disparate-impact but that the employer nevertheless refuses to adopt. Id. § 2000e-
2(k)(1)(A)(ii), (k)(i)(C). This third prong, however, proves much less significant in
practice than the first two.
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VII's disparate-impact prong ends up "requir[ing] ... the removal of artificial,
arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment"-at least "when the barriers
operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible
classification."7 It thus advances labor's goal of limiting employer discretion to
engage in arbitrary treatment by compelling employers to replace at least some
arbitrary employment practices with fairer ones, a requirement that benefits all
workers, not just members of protected classes."
Consider, for example, one type of employment practice that is often the tar-
get of disparate-impact challenges: scored employment tests. The Supreme Court
has held that employment tests that produce a disparate impact violate Title VII
"unless they are demonstrably a reasonable measure of job performance."79 The
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), in turn, has promulgated
a set of elaborate guidelines identifying various methodologies for validating pro-
fessionally developed employment tests as sufficiently job-related."o An employer
thus cannot successfully invoke the business-necessity defense to justify an em-
ployment test that produces a disparate impact without demonstrating in some
detail that the test selects and excludes workers based on job-relevant qualities.
And employers face a similar burden when attempting to defend against dispar-
ate-impact challenges to non-numeric, but still objective,"' hiring criteria (such
as educational attainment, professional experience, and licensing require-
ments)." As with validating employment tests, scrutinizing hiring criteria helps
77. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
78. Cf Susan D. Carle, A Social Movement History of Title VII Disparate Impact Analysis,
63 FLA. L. REV. 251, 258 (2011) ("[D]isparate impact analysis does not require em-
ployers to forgo business benefits in the interests of racial diversity, but uses racial
impact as a warning sign that should trigger scrutiny of the rationality or fit between
means and objectives with respect to the employment practice in question."); id. at
296 ("Ideally, disparate impact doctrine encourages employers to use selection de-
vices suited to measuring the performance characteristics required in particular
jobs, without litigation."); id. at 300 (arguing that disparate impact encourages
"employers to scrutinize their traditional practices and consider the adoption of
alternatives that are both better suited to select employees based on job perfor-
mance requirements and produce less severe disparate impact").
79. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 436; see Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975)
(" [D] iscriminatory tests are impermissible unless shown, by professionally accepta-
ble methods, to be predictive of or significantly correlated with important elements
of work behavior which comprise or are relevant to the job or jobs for which can-
didates are being evaluated." (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
80. See Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures (1978), 29 C.F.R. § 1607
(2011).
81. Once again, in this context, a criterion is "objective" insofar as an employer can
apply it without having to exercise her judgment. See supra note 21.
82. As the Third Circuit has explained in explicating the Supreme Court's various prec-
edents on the business-necessity defense, employers may not use "rough-cut
measures of employment-related qualities" as hiring criteria, but "rather ... must
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to curb arbitrary treatment in the workplace by constraining employer discre-
tion, compelling employers to evaluate job applicants based on job-related qual-
ities rather than extraneous ones.
Given how closely courts scrutinize scored tests and other objective hiring
criteria that produce a disparate impact, we might worry that Title VII's dispar-
ate-impact theory has the unintended consequence of incentivizing employers to
adopt more subjective criteria, thereby enhancing employer discretion. If em-
ployers risk liability (or at least litigation) under Title VII by using objective cri-
teria that might not adequately measure job-related qualities (and thus might not
satisfy the business-necessity defense), they might turn to subjective criteria in-
stead. Subjective criteria are less amenable to the kinds of methodologies used to
validate objective criteria like scored tests and thus less are likely to be exposed as
insufficiently job-related and consistent with business necessity. And because
subjective criteria afford employers more decisionmaking discretion than do ob-
jective criteria, Title VII might end up impeding, rather than promoting, the la-
bor goal of curtailing arbitrary treatment in the workplace.3
This concern is undoubtedly legitimate. At least in theory, however, it is
somewhat allayed by the Supreme Court's decision to recognize disparate-impact
challenges to subjective employment practices-that is, practices that leave im-
portant employment decisions largely to employers' discretion.4 By requiring
tailor their criteria to measure those qualities accurately and directly for each ap-
plicant." El v. Se. Penn. Transp. Auth., 479 F.3d 232, 240 (2007).
83. Subjective employment practices might undermine not only labor goals, but also
antidiscrimination norms. Many scholars argue that racial and other kinds of bias
can be unconscious as well as conscious. See, e.g., Linda Hamilton Krieger, The
Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal
Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995); Charles R. Lawrence III, The
Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L.
REV. 317 (1987). And, as the Supreme Court has observed, subjective decisionmak-
ing practices facilitate the expression of unconscious bias more readily than objec-
tive ones do. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 990 (1988) (cit-
ing "the problem of subconscious stereotypes and prejudices" as one reason to
apply Title VII's disparate- impact theory to subjective employment practices); see
also Tristin K. Green, Discrimination in Workplace Dynamics: Toward a Structural
Account of Disparate Treatment Theory, 38 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 91 (2003);
Melissa Hart, Subjective Decision making and Unconscious Discrimination, 56 ALA. L.
REV. 741 (2005); Krieger, supra; Lawrence, supra; Susan Sturm, Second Generation
Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458, 484-89
(2001).
84. See Watson, 487 U.S. at 990-91 ("If an employer's undisciplined system of subjective
decisionmaking has precisely the same effects as a system pervaded by impermissi-
ble intentional discrimination, it is difficult to see why Title VII's proscription
against discriminatory actions should not apply."). The Court noted that subjective
employment practices are also amenable to disparate-treatment challenges. See id.
at 988-89. A leading treatise notes that, "[als a practical matter, plaintiffs often pro-
ceed under both [disparate-treatment and disparate-impact] theories." 1 BARBARA
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employers to defend their subjective employment practices as well as their objec-
tive ones," Title VII's disparate-impact theory could potentially dampen any per-
verse incentives it might otherwise create for employers to prefer the former
kinds of practices to the latter, thereby rendering itself more consistent with la-
bor's goal of limiting employer discretion.
Indeed, this feature of Title VII's disparate-impact theory could in principle
help to advance, rather than merely avoid hindering, that goal. In deciding
whether a subjective employment practice is nevertheless job-related and con-
sistent with business necessity, courts consider a number of factors. These factors
concern the degree to which the subjective practice incorporates some of the safe-
guards inherent in objective ones, such as whether the practice requires the rele-
vant decisionmaker to follow certain articulated guidelines and standards in ex-
ercising her discretion." The more closely a subjective employment practice
resembles an objective one, the more likely it is to survive a disparate-impact
challenge. An employer's surest bet of avoiding disparate-impact liability is thus
to eschew employment practices that treat employees arbitrarily or that indirectly
facilitate such treatment-that is, to limit her own discretion."
Although disparate-impact challenges to subjective employment practices
thus have the potential to promote labor goals, they tend not to do so in practice.
Plaintiffs rarely bring such challenges, and even when they do, the challenges
rarely succeed." We should thus not exaggerate the ability of Title VII's dispar-
ate-impact theory to curb employer discretion. But this Article does not maintain
T. LINDEMANN & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 254 (4 th ed.
2007).
85. Indeed, subjective employment practices may be harder for employers to defend
than objective ones. See Watson, 487 U.S. at 991-92 (plurality opinion) (worrying
that employers will rarely be able to validate subjective employment practices as
job-related and consistent with business necessity).
86. See 1 LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 84, at 258-64 (noting that courts consider
such factors as "whether the decision is pursuant to a professional job analysis,"
"whether raters operate under specific safeguards and guidelines," "whether selec-
tion criteria are based on observable behaviors or performances," "whether the
evaluator is a member of the plaintiff's protected group," "whether viable objective
criteria are available," and "whether the employer provides notice of job opportu-
nities").
87. This salutary effect is undermined somewhat by the fact that courts tend to accord
employers a little more leeway to use subjective criteria when making decisions re-
garding "white collar" jobs as opposed to "blue collar" jobs, a significant lacuna in
Title VII's protections. See id. at 256-57. For criticism of this differential treatment
of the two classes of jobs, see Elizabeth Bartholet, Application of Title VII to Jobs in
High Places, 95 HARv. L. REV. 945 (1982); and David Charny & G. Mitu Gulati, Effi-
ciency-Wages, Tournaments, and Discrimination: A Theory of Employment Discrim-
ination Law for "High-Level" Jobs, 33 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 57 (1998).
88. See, e.g., Elizabeth Tippett, Robbing a Barren Vault: The Implications of Dukes v.
Wal-Mart for Cases Challenging Subjective Employment Practices, 29 HOFSTRA LAB.
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that the disparate-impact theory perfectly accords with labor goals. Rather, it
makes the comparative claim that the theory better accords with labor goals than
does the ADA. And as we shall see, even if the disparate-impact theory ends up
limiting employer discretion less than it might initially seem to promise, the ADA
affirmatively requires employers to exercise discretion." Relative to the ADA,
then, Title VII's disparate-impact theory helps to advance labor's goal of elimi-
nating arbitrary employment practices by restraining employer discretion.
Title VII's disparate-impact theory, of course, imposes no freestanding duty
on employers to revise arbitrary employment practices; any such duty is triggered
only by the plaintiffs showing of a race- or sex-based disparate impact and the
employer's failure to satisfy the business-necessity defense. As in the case of Title
VII's disparate-treatment theory, then, the disparate-impact theory seeks above
all to combat discrimination (and its effects), not to constrain employer discre-
tion for its own sake. But to realize even this more limited ambition, the theory
requires employers to scrutinize and defend their employment practices to a
greater extent than they would have to under an unmodified at-will rule-a re-
quirement that helps to advance labor's goal of curbing arbitrary treatment by
limiting employer discretion.
II. LABOR GOALS AND THE ADA
Ever since its enactment, commentators have debated whether the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act merely extends the antidiscrimination norms enshrined
in Title VII to another disadvantaged social group or whether it instead promul-
gates a novel set of norms to combat a novel form of discrimination.9 o While
acknowledging the significant functional similarities between the ADA and as-
pects of Title VII, this Part argues that the ADA differs from Title VII in an im-
portant, yet underappreciated, respect: the degree to which it stands in tension
with the traditional labor goal of cabining employer discretion. In particular,
whereas Title VII's disparate-impact prong usually mandates wholesale revisions
of employment policies for all employees, the ADA frequently requires employers
& EMP. L.J. 433, 435 (2012) ("My research suggests that .... cases challenging sub-
jective employment practices were very uncommon even prior to the Wal-Mart de-
cision. An average employer's litigation risk in connection with such claims was so
vanishingly small during the 2005-2011 time frame that I surmise that few employers
adopted measures or altered their behavior to address this litigation risk."); cf Mi-
chael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701, 746
(20o6) (" [T] here is no question that the intentional discrimination framework can
serve to challenge subjective employment practices, and there is very little to gain,
and much to lose, by resorting to the disparate impact framework."). The Supreme
Court's decision in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes made it even more difficult to
bring such challenges by tightening the requirements for certifying nationwide class
actions challenging subjective employment practices. 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011).
89. See infra Section II.A.
90. See supra notes 14-15.
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to make retail accommodations for individual employees-that is, ad hoc excep-
tions to the policies on a case-by-case basis. Because employers cannot make such
accommodations without exercising significant discretion, Section II.A con-
tends, the ADA's accommodation requirement is in tension with traditional la-
bor goals. As Section II.B explains, this tension came to a head in US Airways,
Inc. v. Barnett,9 where the Supreme Court seemed decisively to vindicate labor
goals over the ADA's accommodation requirement. Normatively, Section II.C
tentatively defends Barnett's resolution of the tension between the ADA's accom-
modation requirement and labor goals, emphasizing the ways in which the deci-
sion protects discretion-constraining workplace policies while acknowledging
the costs it imposes on disabled employees and job seekers.
A. The Tension Between the ADA's Accommodation Requirement and Labor
Goals
The ADA provides that "[nlo covered entity shall discriminate against a
qualified individual on the basis of disability."92 The statute defines "discrimina-
tion" to include "limiting, segregating, or classifying a job applicant or employee
in a way that adversely affects the opportunities or status of such applicant or
employee because of [her] disability."93 Like Title VII's prohibition of disparate
treatment based on race and other protected characteristics, these provisions
simultaneously promote individualized treatment and constrain employer dis-
cretion by proscribing a particular ground on which employers might otherwise
make employment decisions. But unlike Title VII, the ADA proceeds to define a
"qualified individual" as "an individual who, with or without reasonable accom-
modation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that
such individual holds or desires."94 It further defines "discrimination" to include
not only disparate treatment based on disability, but also an employer's "not
making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations
of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability .. . unless ... the accommo-
dation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the [employer's]
business."95
While the ADA's accommodation requirement might initially seem to herald
an abrupt break with earlier employment-discrimination laws, it turns out to be
functionally similar to certain aspects of Title VII. In particular, as Christine Jolls
convincingly argues, Title VII's disparate-impact prong also imposes an accom-
modation requirement on employers insofar as it "requires employers to incur
special costs in response to the distinctive needs . . . of particular, identifiable
91. 535 U.S. 391 (2002).
92. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2006 & Supp. II 2009).
93. Id. § 12112(b)(1).
94. Id. § 12111(8) (emphasis added).
95. Id. § 12112(b)(5)(A).
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demographic groups of employees ... and imposes this requirement in circum-
stances in which the employer has no intention of... 'discriminating against' the
group in the canonical sense."9' Both Title VII and the ADA thus compel em-
ployers to bear the costs-subject to the "business necessity" and "undue-hard-
ship" defenses, respectively-of revising existing employment practices in order
to accommodate the members of disadvantaged social groups in the workplace.
Both, moreover, impose these costs by at least somewhat circumscribing em-
ployer discretion: just as Title VII's disparate-impact theory sometimes requires
an employer to jettison employment practices she would otherwise retain, so the
ADA's accommodation requirement sometimes forces an employer to hire indi-
viduals she would otherwise reject-namely, any "qualified individual with a dis-
ability" who requests a "reasonable accommodation" that would not impose an
"undue hardship" on the employer's business operations."
Though significant, this latter similarity between the two statutes is not the
end of the story. Unlike Title VII's disparate-impact prong, the ADA's accom-
modation requirement frequently mandates retail accommodations for individ-
ual employees rather than wholesale accommodations for entire workforces-an
individualized approach that enhances employer discretion. As we have seen' 8
the typical Title VII disparate-impact claim seeks to compel the employer to re-
vise the challenged employment practice not just for the individual plaintiff or
even the other members of her protected class, but for all the workers to whom
it applies.99 After losing a disparate-impact challenge to an employment test, for
instance, an employer will often have to design a new test, not simply adjust the
plaintiffs individual score. 00
96. Jolls, supra note 15, at 648; see id. at 645, 652-66.
97. According to one commentator, because its accommodation requirement fre-
quently compels employers to modify their workplace policies, "the ADA cuts into
the discretion of employers to run their workplaces as they see fit perhaps more
than other antidiscrimination statutes." Alex B. Long, "If the Train Should Jump the
Track...":Divergent Interpretations ofState and Federal Employment Discrimination
Statutes, 4o GA. L. REV. 469, 494 (2006).
98. See supra notes 79-82 and accompanying text.
99. See, e.g., 1 LINDEMANN & GROSSMAN, supra note 84, at 228 ("Most of the adverse
impact cases involving nonscored objective criteria deal with employer policies or
practices, as opposed to single, isolated decisions.").
ioo. See id. at 221-22 ("Remedies that focus on reformulating tests and test criteria 'to
minimize any racially disparate impact within the framework of designing a valid
and comprehensive' test are clearly favored over minority preferences." (quoting
Allen v. Ala. State Bd. of Educ., 164 F.3d 1347,1352-53 (11th Cir. 1999))). Other typical
remedies in testing cases are similarly wholesale in that they affect everyone who
takes the test, not just members of protected groups. See id. at 219 (observing that
courts in testing cases have ordered such remedies as "lowering the cutoff score of
a test so as to include larger numbers of minorities or women in the passing group"
and "requir [ing] employers to choose from among candidates within the same test-
score range (banding) rather than by strict rank-order").
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The ADA, by contrast, usually mandates a more individualized response.o
Rather than accommodate a disabled employee by revising a generally applicable
workplace policy, an employer will typically craft an exemption that applies to
the employee alone. Such an approach is explicitly contemplated by both the
ADA itself"o2 and the EEOC's enforcement guidelines,0 3 and is taken for granted
in the scholarly literature.10 4 That approach is, moreover, a product of procedure
as well as substance. The EEOC has interpreted the ADA to require employers to
engage in an "interactive process" with disabled employees requesting accommo-
dations, during which the parties attempt to identify possible accommodations
that will address the employee's needs without unduly disrupting the employer's
loi. To be sure, like Title VII, the ADA prohibits disparate-impact discrimination. See
42 U.S.C. § 1212(b)(6) (20o6). But this provision has been largely overshadowed by
the ADA's accommodation requirement. See Michael Ashley Stein & Michael E.
Waterstone, Disability, Disparate Impact, and Class Actions, 56 DUKE L.J. 861, 864
(2006) ("Under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), individual claims to
accommodate specific impairments in particular jobs have all but eclipsed a coher-
ent theory of disability-related disparate impact law.").
102. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9) ("The term 'reasonable accommodation' may in-
clude ... job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to
a vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices, appropriate
adjustment or modifications of examinations, training materials or policies, the
provision of qualified readers or interpreters, and other similar accommodations
for individuals with disabilities.").
103. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(0) (2011) (identifying a wide range of potential ac-
commodations among which employers may choose, including permitting "an in-
dividual who is blind to use a guide dog at work," permitting "an employee with a
disability that inhibits the ability to write .. . to computerize records that were cus-
tomarily maintained manually," and providing personal assistants such as page
turners and travel attendants).
104. See, e.g., Bagenstos, supra note 15, at 836 ("When I speak of a requirement of 'ac-
commodation,' I mean a requirement, like the one in Title I of the ADA, that em-
ployers make individualized changes in facially neutral rules, structures, or tasks to
enable a protected class member to perform a given job and produce as much out-
put as non-accommodated coworkers." (emphasis added)); Carlos A. Ball, Prefer-
ential Treatment and Reasonable Accommodation Under the Americans with Disabil-
ities Act, 55 ALA. L. REV. 951, 974-76 (2004) (contrasting the individualized character
of accommodations under the ADA with the class-based character of affirmative
action); Karlan & Rutherglen, supra note 14, at 13 ("ADA cases are likely to be in-
tensely context-specific."); id. at 14-16 (noting the "retail" nature of accommoda-
tions under the ADA, in contrast to the "class-based" approach of disparate-impact
claims and affirmative action); Michael Ashley Stein et al., Accommodating Every
Body, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 52), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2315271 ("Claims for accom-
modation usually proceed in the following way: individuals advance individual
claims and, when successful, those claims result in employers granting one-time
exceptions to otherwise standard rules and policies.").
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business.o5 Like many of the illustrative accommodations enumerated in the stat-
ute and the EEOC's regulations, the "interactive process" assumes that an em-
ployer will retain the generally applicable policy at issue and specially exempt the
disabled employee.
Unlike Title VII, then, the ADA's accommodation requirement ends up di-
rectly mandating individualized treatment for disabled employees. It requires
employers not just to eschew disability-based disparate treatment or to revise
policies that have an adverse disparate impact on disabled employees as a class,
but to attend to every (qualified) disabled employee's unique needs and to tailor
workplace policies accordingly so that every (qualified) disabled employee can
fully participate in the workplace. This vision of individualized treatment reflects
at least two unique features of disability-based discrimination. First, whereas
race- and sex-based discrimination is typically the product of (conscious or sub-
conscious) prejudice against the members of fairly well-defined social groups,
disability-based discrimination tends to stem from (frequently visceral) reactions
to the particular disabilities of particular individuals-this employee's blindness
or that one's paralysis.' In order to counteract disability-based discrimination,
then, we cannot simply forbid employers to rely on group-based stereotypes; we
must also prod them to look beyond the most immediate manifestations of an
employee's disability to the employee's other, job-related qualities.
Second, the disability-rights movement has historically emphasized the role
played in disability-based discrimination by unreflective assumptions regarding
how workplaces and jobs should be structured."o7 The category "disabled," on
this view, is socially constructed, in the sense that whether a particular individual
falls within that category depends not only on facts about her biology, but also
on how society has decided over time to design workplaces and to specify the
particular qualifications for any given job.o' If disability-based discrimination is
as much a product of societal insensitivity as personal prejudice, then one partic-
ularly effective way of remedying such discrimination is to force employers to
reflect on the decisions they make in structuring their workplaces and how those
decisions systematically exclude particular individuals-precisely what the
ADA's accommodation requirement seeks to accomplish. Such an approach is
also normatively appealing insofar as it makes literal the promise of individual-
ized treatment underlying all of antidiscrimination law.o9
105. 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.9; see, e.g., Tobin v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 433 F.3d loo, 1o9-1o
(1st Cir. 2005).
1o6. Miller, supra note 7, at 520-21.
107. See Bagenstos, supra note 7, at 423-36; Stein et al., supra note 104 (manuscript at 6-
7). But see Stein, supra note 15, at 587 (arguing that at least some other forms of
discrimination are also the product of similar assumptions).
1o8. See Bagenstos, supra note 7, at 423-36.
109. See supra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
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But despite its virtues, the ADA's accommodation requirement is in tension
with traditional labor goals. To implement the retail accommodations mandated
by the statute, employers must exercise discretion, departing from generally ap-
plicable workplace policies and treating some of their employees differently than
others.no Although such discretion is exercised in the name of promoting the
ADA's antidiscrimination norms, it increases the risk of arbitrary treatment in
the workplace.
We might initially think otherwise. Even if the ADA requires employers to
exercise discretion in crafting individualized exceptions to generally applicable
workplace polices, it might not thereby enhance their ability to engage in arbi-
trary treatment. This might be so because of both the kinds and number of excep-
tions the ADA licenses.
The kinds of exceptions licensed by the ADA-exceptions that are legally
mandated rather than optional-might not be particularly likely to undermine
discretion-constraining policies and thus might not especially threaten the labor
goal of curtailing arbitrary treatment. For any discretion an employer must exer-
cise in making an exception would seem to be strictly circumscribed by the ADA's
legal regime, thereby preventing the employer from mistreating the disabled em-
ployee requesting the exception, let alone other employees.
Moreover, the ADA licenses only one general category of exceptions to gen-
erally applicable workplace polices-to wit, exceptions mandated by the statute's
accommodation requirement. After an employer makes an ADA-mandated ex-
ception to a workplace policy, the policy continues to apply to all her other em-
ployees-no additional exceptions are permitted-and thus appears to continue
to constrain her discretion with respect to them. Because it channels employers'
discretion to make exceptions to generally applicable workplace policies through
a highly detailed legal regime, and because it provides only one basis for making
those exceptions, the ADA's accommodation requirement seems not to jeopard-
ize labor goals after all.
There are, however, at least two reasons to doubt this Pollyannaish picture.
First, it assumes that the ADA's requirements are more or less transparent, such
that it is usually obvious whether an individual qualifies for an accommodation
under the statute. But in fact, nearly every accommodation decision requires the
decisionmaker to exercise judgment. And because a relatively small fraction of all
accommodation requests will be litigated, it is the employer, rather than a judge
or EEOC official, who will often be the ultimate decisionmaker. Is an individual's
no. This is not to suggest that all accommodation mandates necessarily require em-
ployers to exercise discretion. For example, the Family and Medical Leave Act
(FMLA) imposes an accommodation mandate on certain employers by requiring
them to give eligible employees who are unable to work due to a "serious health
condition" up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave annually. Family and Medical Leave
Act (FMLA) of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601, 2611-2619 (20o6). But because the FMLA
defines its mandated accommodation with great specificity-viz., twelve weeks of
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impairment a "disability"?"' Is the individual "qualified" for the position?".
Would the accommodation she requests be "reasonable"? Would the accommo-
ill. As amended in 2008, the ADA defines "disability" primarily to mean "a physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more major life activities of such
individual." 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)(A) (20o6 & Supp. II 2009). "Major life activities,"
in turn, "include, but are not limited to, caring for oneself, performing manual tasks,
seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking,
breathing, learning, reading, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and work-
ing," as well as "the operation of a major bodily function, including but not limited
to, functions of the immune system, normal cell growth, digestive, bowel, bladder,
neurological, brain, respiratory, circulatory, endocrine, and reproductive func-
tions." Id. § 121o2(2)(A)-(B) (emphasis added). Finally, the statute provides that the
question of whether an impairment "substantially limits" a "major life activity"
should be answered "without regard to the ameliorative effects of mitigating
measures such as-(I) medication, medical supplies, equipment, or appliances,
low-vision devices[,] . . . [and] prosthetics . . . (II) use of assistive technology; (III)
reasonable accommodations or auxiliary aids or services; or (IV) learned behavioral
or adaptive neurological modifications"; however, " [t]he ameliorative effects of the
mitigating measures of ordinary eyeglasses or contact lenses shall be considered in
determining whether an impairment substantially limits a major life activity." Id.
§ 12102(4)(E)(i)-(ii). Despite their seeming detail, all these provisions raise almost
as many questions as they answer. And while the EEOC has promulgated guidelines
to fill many of the interpretive gaps, see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2-.3 (2011), they cannot
possibly anticipate every scenario employers are likely to confront. Nor can they
even eliminate the need for employers to exercise discretion in those scenarios they
do manage to foresee.
112. As noted, the ADA forbids an employer to discriminate against only "a qualified
individual on the basis of disability." 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (emphasis added). It de-
fines a "qualified individual with a disability," in turn, as "an individual who, with
or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the
employment position that such individual holds or desires." Id. § 12111(8) (empha-
sis added). Rather than attempt to define ex ante what features of a particular job
constitute its "essential functions," the statute leaves that definitional issue largely
to employers' discretion. Indeed the statute provides that "consideration shall be
given to the employer's judgment as to what functions of a job are essential, and if
an employer has prepared a written description before advertising or interviewing
applicants for the job, this description shall be considered evidence of the essential
functions of the job." Id. To be sure, as with the question of when an impairment
constitutes a "disability," see supra note ilI, the EEOC has promulgated guidelines
for identifying the "essential functions" of a job, see 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n). But once
again, the guidelines will not resolve every case and thus will not eliminate employ-
ers' discretion to decide which employees are eligible for accommodations. Nor will
courts. Though they do not reflexively accept employers' statements of the essential
functions of particular jobs, they do tend to defer substantially to those statements
on the ground that defining the essential functions of a job is a business decision
that courts are ill-suited to second-guess. See, e.g., Rehrs v. lams Co., 486 F.3d 353
(8th Cir. 2007). The upshot is that employers enjoy substantial discretion to set the
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dation, though reasonable, nevertheless impose an "undue hardship" on the em-
ployer's business operations? None of these questions are binaries; each admits
of degree. When faced with an accommodation request, then, employers must
exercise judgment at each step of the analysis, assessing how likely the individual
would be to satisfy each of the ADA's criteria in court."' To be sure, in some cases,
the answers will be obvious, leaving the employer with no real discretion. But in
most cases, the resolution of at least one of the prongs will be unclear, such that
the employer will have to exercise her best judgment.
As the criticisms of the at-will rule demonstrate, with the discretion to exer-
cise judgment comes the potential for abuse. In particular, while scrupulous em-
ployers will exercise their discretion under the ADA in conformity with the stat-
ute's purposes," 4 more capricious employers might use their discretion to reward
and punish employees and job applicants based on arbitrary factors. Consider
just two possible scenarios that illustrate the risks. Imagine a workplace with a
policy categorically forbidding telecommuting. Now suppose an employee re-
quests an ADA accommodation permitting her to work from home. Assuming
the employee is not obviously a "qualified individual with a disability" within the
meaning of the ADA, the employer will enjoy some discretion in deciding
whether to grant her request. And even if she is obviously qualified and disabled,
the employer will still enjoy discretion to shape the accommodation's precise
contours-to determine how many hours a week she may work from home, what
equipment she will be given to facilitate the telecommuting, and so on. The em-
ployer could exploit this discretion to effectively extort the employee's acquies-
cence in some other workplace matter (say, the employer's unpopular plan to
shorten lunch breaks).
Or suppose the employer receives the same accommodation request from an
employee whom she finds irritating or who has criticized some of her previous
decisions. The employer could deny the accommodation (or, if the employee is
obviously qualified and disabled, manipulate the accommodation to make it less
generous) as a way of spiting or punishing the employee."' Needless to say, this
essential functions of a job and thus to determine the likelihood that disabled indi-
viduals will receive accommodations for that job-discretion that is expressly con-
templated by the ADA and preserved by courts.
113. And even when it is clear that an employee is entitled to some accommodation, if
multiple accommodations would do, the EEOC's regulations explicitly provide that
"the employer providing the accommodation has the ultimate discretion to choose
between effective accommodations." 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630-9.
114. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(A) ("The definition of 'disability' ... shall be construed in
accordance with the following: ... The definition of disability in this chapter shall
be construed in favor of broad coverage of individuals under this chapter, to the
maximum extent permitted by the terms of this chapter.").
115. One potential check on this kind of chicanery is the ADA's antiretaliation provi-
sions. See 42 U.S.C. § 12203(a) ("No person shall discriminate against any individual
because such individual has opposed any act or practice made unlawful by this
chapter or because such individual made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated
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is precisely the kind of arbitrary treatment that the at-will rule licenses and the
labor movement has long sought to combat.
The first reason to think that the ADA's accommodation requirement en-
hances employer discretion thus concerns the kinds of exceptions to generally
applicable workplace policies that the statute typically licenses. Far from being
carefully circumscribed by clearly defined legal criteria, an exception made pur-
suant to the ADA often requires the employer to exercise considerable judgment
in interpreting those criteria, thereby augmenting the employer's discretion.
The second reason, in contrast, concerns the number of exceptions licensed
by the ADA's accommodation requirement. Although the ADA formally author-
izes only one general category of exceptions (i.e., those mandated by the statute
itself), it may have the effect of also promoting other, non-disability-related ex-
ceptions. Once employers grant their disabled employees accommodations un-
der the ADA, they may begin to grant similar accommodations to their nondisa-
bled employees as well (assuming there is no collective-bargaining agreement or
other legal barrier blocking them from doing so). Indeed, some scholars regard
the ADA's potential to encourage employers to adopt more flexible workplace
policies for all employees, disabled and nondisabled alike, as one of its most sal-
utary consequences."' Once an employer accommodates a disabled employee by
allowing her to telecommute, for instance, the employer may be more inclined
to make similar exceptions to a general policy requiring workplace attendance
for other employees who, though not disabled within the meaning of the ADA,
wish for whatever reason to occasionally work from home. While this increased
flexibility promises significant benefits for nondisabled employees, it entails what
the labor movement would regard as a significant cost: undermining a generally
applicable workplace policy designed to constrain the discretion of employers
and thus their ability to engage in arbitrary treatment.
But would labor really be concerned about this type of spillover effect? After
all, if employers are prompted to permit some of their nondisabled employees to
telecommute after being compelled by the ADA to allow their disabled employees
in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under this chapter."); id.
§ 12203(b) ("It shall be unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with
any individual in the exercise or enjoyment of. .. any right granted or protected by
this chapter."). But, of course, the ADA will not always prohibit the practice op-
posed or protect the right exercised, nor will most accommodation requests lead to
formal EEOC proceedings or litigation. Cf Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532
U.S. 268 (2001) (per curiam) (raising without deciding the question of whether Title
VII protects an employee from retaliation only when the employee "opposes" a
practice that is in fact proscribed by Title VII or also when the employee "reasona-
bly believes" in "good faith" that the practice violates Title VII).
116. See, e.g., Elizabeth F. Emens, Integrating Accommodation, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 839
(2008); Michelle A. Travis, Lashing Back at the ADA Backlash: How the Americans
with Disabilities Act Benefits Americans Without Disabilities, 76 TENN. L. REV. 311
(2009).
33
YALE LAW& POLICY REVIEW
to do so, they would in that case be exercising their discretion to benefit the non-
disabled employees, not to harm them. Would the traditional labor critique of
the at-will rule really condemn this beneficent exercise of discretion?
It would-for at least two reasons. First, although employers undoubtedly
can (and often do) exercise their discretion to benefit their employees, labor has
been unwilling to blindly trust that they will do so. Labor has instead viewed dis-
cretion as a force prone to abuse, just as likely to be turned against employees as
to be exercised in their favor."' Accordingly, labor has advocated policies that
seek to limit most discretion in the "core" areas of employer decisionmaking"-
even at the cost of preventing employers from helping particular employees in
particular cases. When employers are spurred by the ADA to relax policies de-
signed to constrain their discretion, labor is at the very least ambivalent: recog-
nizing the potential benefits for employees but also fearing the potential abuses.
Second, even assuming that employers would exercise their enhanced discre-
tion only to benefit their nondisabled employees, labor would still have cause for
concern. For employers could use their enhanced discretion to help employees
arbitrarily, for reasons of favoritism rather than merit. And when one employee
is arbitrarily singled out for special benefits, the other employees (who may be
just as deserving) are harmed-though admittedly not as severely as if they had
suffered some adverse employment action, such as a demotion or pay cut. To be
sure, a policy permitting telecommuting or other accommodations could seek to
prevent this kind of harm by constraining an employer's discretion to implement
it. It could, for example, permit any employee who satisfies certain well-defined
criteria to work from home for up to twenty hours each week. But even policies
with well-defined criteria can be flexible in practice."9 And even those that seem
less flexible cannot define away all discretion; like the ADA's various provisions,
the eligibility criteria and other terms of the policy must still be interpreted. Ra-
ther than take the gamble that employers will exercise this discretion in a nonar-
bitrary manner, labor has traditionally preferred to limit the risk of arbitrary
treatment by limiting discretion. It thus might not be so quick to embrace the
ADA's potential to proliferate workplace accommodations as an unmitigated
boon for employees.
117. See, e.g., Berne C. Kluber, Comment, FLSA Exemptions and the Computing Work-
force, 33 Hous. L. REV. 859, 911 (1996) ("An economist for the AFL-CIO, Markley
Roberts, has stated that '(w)e are very, very leery about employers having the right
to set flexible hours because the temptation is almost irresistible to do that in a way
that benefits the employer."' (quoting Peggy Roberson, Rudy Labors to Amend Law
to Avert Cash Hit on City, CRAIN'S N.Y. Bus., May 22, 1995, at 25)).
118. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
119. See, e.g., Erin L. Kelly & Alexandra Kalev, Managing Flexible Work Arrangements in
US Organizations: Formalized Discretion or "A Right To Ask"?, 4 Socio-ECON. REV.
379 (20o6) (finding that most "flexible work arrangements" (such as flextime)
merely "formalize discretion," rather than eliminate it, and consequently allow em-
ployers to decide whether to permit particular employees to utilize such programs,
resulting in limited and unequal access).
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Of course, whether the ADA will actually augment employer discretion in
any given workplace depends on the ex ante baseline level of discretion there-
that is, the level of discretion that would obtain irrespective of the ADA. At one
extreme, a workplace might be governed by an unadorned at-will rule, in which
case the ADA will give the employer new ways to exercise her discretion (and thus
new ways to engage in arbitrary treatment) but will not increase the overall
amount of discretion at her disposal. At the other extreme, a workplace might be
governed by a collective-bargaining agreement that specifies nearly every facet of
employer/employee relations, in which case the ADA will enhance the employer's
discretion considerably, for the reasons noted in this Section. Along this spec-
trum lie workplaces with varying mixes of rigid and flexible policies-and thus
varying levels of employer discretion. Whether the ADA will raise the baseline
level of discretion (and if so, by how much) will vary accordingly from workplace
to workplace, as will any threat posed by the statute to traditional labor goals. But
what is clear is that the retail accommodations mandated by the ADA will raise
the baseline level of discretion-and thus the risk of arbitrary treatment-in
every workplace more than the wholesale accommodations mandated by Title
VII's disparate-impact theory.
It bears emphasis that the contrast drawn in this Section between Title VII
and the ADA is a generalization. Not all accommodations under the ADA are
retail, and not all accommodations under Title VII are wholesale. Indeed, many
of the accommodations expressly contemplated by the ADA, such as the physical
restructuring of workplaces, alter working conditions for all employees-disa-
bled and nondisabled alike-and would seem to require employers to exercise
little discretion."o And while a successful Title VII disparate-impact claim usually
leads the employer to revise the challenged employment practice for all employ-
ees, courts sometimes permit individualized exemptions instead."' In some cases,
120. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12n(9)(A) (20o6) ("The term 'reasonable accommodation'
may include . .. making existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to
and usable by individuals with disabilities .... ); 29 C.F.R. app. § 1630.2(0) (iden-
tifying as a reasonable accommodation "making employer provided transportation
accessible").
121. For example, courts have found "no beard" policies to have an impermissible dis-
parate impact on black men, who are more prone to a skin condition that prevents
them from shaving. Yet rather than require employers to jettison such policies,
courts usually allow them to exempt black male employees while retaining the pol-
icies for other employees. See Jolls, supra note 15, at 655, 699 & n.55.
Title VII also requires employers "to reasonably accommodate" their employ-
ees' religious practices, 42 U.S.C. § 200oe(j), a requirement that seems to entail the
kinds of retail accommodations that are typical under the ADA. The requirement
proves relatively insignificant in practice, however, since it is subject to an "undue-
hardship" defense, see id., which the Supreme Court has interpreted to protect em-
ployers from having to bear anything more than "de minimis" costs. Trans World
Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977).
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then, Title VII will threaten traditional labor goals as acutely as the ADA. Never-
theless, because a much greater proportion of its required accommodations are
retail rather than wholesale, the ADA enhances employer discretion much more
significantly than Title VII, posing a commensurately greater threat to traditional
labor goals.
B. Addressing the Tension: US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett
How should we reconcile the ADA's accommodation requirement with tra-
ditional labor goals? Which should take precedence when the two conflict-
when, for example, an employer would have to exercise significant discretion in
order to implement a particular accommodation, potentially undermining a gen-
erally applicable policy designed precisely to curb such discretion? The Supreme
Court confronted this dilemma in US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett' and came down
decisively on the side of the traditional labor goal of limiting employer discretion.
In that case, the plaintiff requested reassignment to another position as an ac-
commodation for his physical disability. His employer ultimately denied the ac-
commodation, claiming that it assigned employees to the position desired by the
plaintiff according to a seniority system and that other employees had greater
seniority rights and thus a greater entitlement to the position.2 3 Although the
ADA provides for "reassignment to a vacant position" as one possible reasonable
accommodation, 4 the Court held that, in a conflict between a seniority system
and an accommodation requested under the ADA, "the seniority system will pre-
vail in the run of cases. . . . [T]o show that a requested accommodation conflicts
with the rules of a seniority system is ordinarily to show that the accommodation
is not 'reasonable."" 25
The Court seems to have viewed the case as presenting a conflict between the
ADA's accommodation requirement and the traditional labor goal of cabining
employer discretion. It concluded that the latter should generally trump the for-
mer. According to the Court, despite having been adopted unilaterally by the em-
ployer rather than through collective bargaining with a union, the seniority sys-
tem provided employees with considerable benefits, including many of the
benefits that organized labor has traditionally ascribed to such systems: "job se-
curity and an opportunity for steady and predictable advancement based on ob-
jective standards," as well as "an element of due process, limiting unfairness in
personnel decisions.""I2' As we have seen, 7 seniority systems secure these benefits
by constraining the decisionmaking discretion that employers enjoy under the
122. 535 U.S. 391 (2002).
123. Id. at 394-95.
124. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B).
125. Barnett, 535 U.S. at 394; see id. at 403, 406.
126. Id. at 404 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
127. See supra notes 45-52 and accompanying text.
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at-will rule, replacing employees' fears of employer arbitrariness with "expecta-
tions of consistent, uniform treatment."" The Court worried that employers
would frustrate these expectations if they had to depart from their seniority sys-
tems in order to comply with the ADA's accommodation requirement. More spe-
cifically, requiring employers even to consider accommodations that would vio-
late their seniority systems "would substitute a complex case-specific
'accommodation' decision made by management for the more uniform, imper-
sonal operation of seniority rules."'29 Due to "its inevitable discretionary ele-
ments,"'30 the accommodation decision threatens to reintroduce into the work-
place the very arbitrariness that seniority systems seek to curb, a threat the Court
was unwilling to tolerate, even for the sake of the ADA's antidiscrimination
norms.
Even as it vindicated traditional labor goals, the Court recognized that a sen-
iority system-especially one adopted unilaterally by an employer-might not
deliver all the benefits in practice that it promises in theory. It thus qualified its
holding to allow an ADA plaintiff to demonstrate that a particular seniority sys-
tem does not, in fact, significantly constrain employer discretion. As the Court
put it, a plaintiff may "show that special circumstances warrant a finding that,
despite the presence of a seniority system . . . the requested 'accommodation' is
'reasonable' on the particular facts."' The Court's two (non-exhaustive) exam-
ples of such "special circumstances" confirm the Court's concern with preserving
seniority systems' discretion-constraining effects. In one example, "the employer,
having retained the right to change the seniority system unilaterally, exercises
that right fairly frequently, reducing employee expectations that the system will
be followed-to the point where one more departure, needed to accommodate
an individual with a disability, will not likely make a difference."'32 In the other,
"the [seniority] system already contains exceptions such that, in the circum-
stances, one further exception [for the disabled employee] is unlikely to mat-
ter." 33 Because the employer in each scenario enjoys significant discretion despite
the existence of a seniority system, requiring it to perform the "complex case-
128. Barnett, 535 U.S. at 404.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 405.
131. Id.
132. Id. Arguably, this exception applied in Barnett itself. As Justice Souter noted in his
dissent:
US Airways apparently took pains to ensure that its seniority rules raised
no great expectations. ... With US Airways itself insisting that its seniority
system was noncontractual and modifiable at will, there is no reason to
think that Barnett's accommodation would have resulted in anything
more than minimal disruption to US Airways's operations, if that.
Id. at 423-24 (Souter, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
133. Id. at 405 (majority opinion).
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specific" accommodation analysis mandated by the ADA would increase the risk
of arbitrary treatment marginally, if at all. Only when a seniority system applies
consistently and uniformly will it truly limit employer discretion and thwart ar-
bitrary treatment, and only then, according to the Court, must the ADA's anti-
discrimination norms yield to traditional labor goals.
C. Evaluating Barnett's Resolution of the Tension Between the ADA and La-
bor Goals
One can read the Court's decision in Barnett either narrowly or broadly. On
the narrow reading, only a bona fide seniority system can trump the ADA's ac-
commodation requirement; accommodations that require employers to make
exceptions to other kinds of workplace policies will usually be reasonable.134 On
the broad reading, Barnett requires the ADA's accommodation requirement to
yield to all workplace policies that constrain employer discretion, at least in most
instances. The Court's reasoning supports, if not compels, the broad reading, for
seniority systems are not the only policies that provide "job security and an op-
portunity for steady and predictable advancement based on objective standards"
and "an element of due process, thereby limiting unfairness in personnel deci-
sions" and creating "expectations of consistent, uniform treatment." 35 Other
policies typically enshrined in collective-bargaining agreements, such as for-
cause requirements and industrial-due-process protections, realize these benefits
as well. Though emblematic of labor's assault on the at-will rule, seniority sys-
tems are but one way of cabining employer discretion and thus preventing arbi-
trary treatment in the workplace.
Assuming the broad reading is the correct one, did the Court in Barnett get
it right? Did it correctly respond to the tension between the ADA's accommoda-
tion requirement and labor's goal of limiting employer discretion? There are at
least three reasons to think it did.
First, the decision helps to call our attention to a broader range of costs that
nondisabled employees must bear when their employers accommodate disabled
employees under the ADA. Many scholars have recognized that the ADA's ac-
commodation requirement imposes significant costs not only on employerses
but also on nondisabled employees."' This recognition, however, has extended
134. See, e.g., EEOC v. United Airlines, Inc., 693 F.3d 760, 764 n-3 (7th Cir. 2012), cert.
denied, 133 S. Ct. 2734 (2013) (tentatively adopting this reading).
135. Barnett, 535 U.S. at 404 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
136. See, e.g., Jolls, supra note 15, at 645.
137. See, e.g., Seth D. Harris, Re-Thinking the Economics ofDiscrimination: U.S. Airways
v. Barnett, the ADA, and the Application of Internal Labor Market Theory, 89 IOWA
L. REV. 123 (2003); Alex B. Long, The ADA's Reasonable Accommodation Require-
ment and "Innocent Third Parties," 68 Mo. L. REV. 863, 905-11 (2003); Nicole B. Por-
ter, Reasonable Burdens: Resolving the Conflict Between Disabled Employees and
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only so far. In particular, scholars tend to focus narrowly on the economic costs
that an accommodation imposes on the nondisabled employees in the particular
workplace where the accommodation is made' " or, somewhat more broadly, on
the labor-market effects of accommodations on general wage and employment
levels.'39 Insofar as scholars look beyond the economic costs of accommodations,
they do not go much further than legal costs, such as the degree to which accom-
modations infringe nondisabled employees' contractually guaranteed rights.1 40
Indeed, in Barnett itself, Justice O'Connor would have condemned accommoda-
tions that require employers to violate their seniority systems only when the sys-
tems legally bind the employers, such that they create legal entitlements for em-
ployees.
14'
As the Barnett majority reminds us, however, accommodations can affect
nondisabled employees not just by displacing them from more desirable posi-
tions or violating their contractual rights, but also by altering the character of
their relationships with their employers. 42 Specifically, Barnett emphasizes the
tendency of certain accommodations to undermine policies that constrain em-
ployer discretion, increasing the risk of arbitrary treatment in the workplace.
Though this consequence of the ADA's accommodation requirement might also
have implications for nondisabled employees' economic well-being (especially
their job security), it is not strictly economic but relational. Indeed, it concerns
the power employers enjoy over their employees and employees' vulnerability to
the whims of their employers. And though legally binding workplace policies will
constrain employer discretion most significantly, even policies adopted unilater-
ally by employers can have similar effects to the extent that employers follow
Their Coworkers, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 313 (2007). But see supra note 116 and accom-
panying text (noting that ADA accommodations might benefit nondisabled em-
ployees as well).
138. See, e.g., Harris, supra note 137 (applying "internal labor market theory" to deter-
mine in what circumstances an accommodation to a seniority system imposes eco-
nomic costs on the other employees who participate in the system); Porter, supra
note 137 (arguing that an accommodation that affects a nondisabled employee
should be deemed unreasonable only if it results in the termination of the em-
ployee).
139. See, e.g., Jolls, supra note 15, at 688-95.
140. See, e.g., Long, supra note 137, at 905-11 (arguing that an accommodation should be
deemed unreasonable not only if it results in "adverse employment action" for an-
other employee, but also if it violates another employee's contractual rights).
141. See US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 408-11 (2002) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring).
142. Cf Nicole Buonocore Porter, Martinizing Title I of the Americans with Disabilities
Act, 47 GA. L. REV. 527, 562-71 (2013) (arguing that an accommodation would be
unreasonable if it would "fundamentally alter the employer-employee relation-
ship," but defining that relationship not in terms of employer discretion but in
terms of more amorphous notions of a proper workplace order).
39
YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW
them (a qualification Barnett recognizes). Accommodations can accordingly en-
hance employer discretion even when they violate no employee's legal entitle-
ments. In considering the extent to which accommodations expand employer
discretion, Barnett presents a fuller accounting of the costs of the ADA's accom-
modation requirement for nondisabled employees.'43
Second, even as it condemns accommodations that undermine discretion-
constraining workplace policies, Barnett might bolster other accommodations
that do not have such an effect. To endorse Barnett is not to deny that the decision
precludes certain kinds of accommodations and thus at least somewhat impedes
the ADA's goal of integrating disabled individuals into the workplace. This re-
grettable consequence, however, might be partly offset by the decision's potential
to temper employee opposition to other kinds of accommodations.
Scholars have documented a backlash against the ADA-hostility by non-
disabled employees and society more generally to the benefits conferred on disa-
bled individuals by the statute, particularly its accommodation requirement.144
Although it is unclear which accommodations provoke the most hostility, it
seems plausible that nondisabled employees will not resent all accommodations
equally. Specifically, employees might resent accommodations that undermine
discretion-constraining policies in core areas of employer decisionmaking more
than ones that do not, since, as we have seen, such policies limit employers' ability
to treat their employees arbitrarily and thus engender expectations of fair, objec-
tive treatment.145 When an accommodation thwarts these expectations, it will
likely elicit significant resentment from the employees who harbored them and
thereby undermine employee solidarity-particularly between disabled and non-
disabled employees. When, by contrast, an accommodation requires an excep-
tion to a policy that already affords the employer considerable discretion (even
in a core area of employer decisionmaking), it will be less likely to frustrate em-
143. Whereas Barnett's reasoning calls our attention to the ADA's effects on relation-
ships between employers and their employees, some scholars have considered the
statute's effects on relationships between disabled and nondisabled employees. See,
e.g., Elizabeth F. Emens, The Sympathetic Discriminator: Mental Illness, Hedonic
Costs, and the ADA, 93 GEO. L.J. 399 (2006) (considering the "hedonic costs" for
nondisabled employees of accommodating individuals with mental illnesses).
144. See Symposium, Backlash Against the ADA: Interdisciplinary Perspectives and Impli-
cations for Social Justice Strategies, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1 (2000).
145. Cf Cheryl L. Anderson, Ideological Dissonance, Disability Backlash, and the ADA
Amendments Act, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 1267, 1315 (2009) (pronouncing mandatory re-
assignment to be an "especially controversial" accommodation, since, "[bly grant-
ing individuals with disabilities the right to an open position, even if there are other,
more qualified individuals the employer ordinarily would choose, the ADA in effect
creates a straight- forward preference for individuals with disabilities").
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ployee expectations and thus less likely to incite employee resentment and un-
dermine solidarity.14' By precluding accommodations that undermine discre-
tion-constraining policies, then, Barnett might mitigate one major source of
backlash against the ADA, putting those accommodations it does not condemn
on a firmer footing.
Third, insofar as employers generally seek to avoid having to make accom-
modations under the ADA, Barnett might incentivize them to adopt more objec-
tive workplace policies, a salutary result for all employees. Read broadly, Barnett
holds that an accommodation will generally be unreasonable if it would require
an employer to violate a policy designed to constrain (and that in fact constrains)
her decisionmaking discretion. Thus, insofar as an employer institutes policies
that limit her discretion, she can to a considerable extent avoid the ADA's ac-
commodation requirement. In this respect, Barnett obviously promotes labor
goals, incentivizing employers to adopt objective policies that limit their ability
to treat their employees arbitrarily. More subtly, it also promotes non-ADA an-
tidiscrimination norms, for numerous psychological studies have shown that dis-
cretionary workplace policies, such as highly subjective hiring criteria, facilitate
the expression of subconscious biases and stereotypes regarding racial minorities
and women, undermining equality of opportunity for those groups.'47 By incen-
tivizing employers to adopt more objective workplace policies, Barnett might
help to advance one of Title VII's main purposes.
Weighing against these possible benefits, of course, is Barnett's potential to
preclude a fair number of accommodations as unreasonable and thus to under-
mine the ADA's purpose of integrating disabled individuals into the workplace.
Whether we endorse Barnett will thus depend on whether we prioritize labor's
goal of limiting employer discretion or the ADA's commitment to individualized
treatment. Because the values at stake are incommensurable, it is impossible to
provide a definitive argument for privileging one over the other. Even after tally-
ing all the costs and benefits of the competing approaches, we will still have to
decide as individuals and a society which value we deem more important. That
said, this Part has identified a number of costs imposed by the ADA's accommo-
dation requirement and has adduced a number of reasons for approving Barnett's
attempt to mitigate those costs. These considerations should cause us to question
our support for the accommodation requirement. And even if we ultimately de-
cide that the requirement's costs to labor goals are worth it, we will at least have
reached a more considered judgment on the issue.
146. Cf Harris, supra note 137, at 135 n.59, 156 nn.137-138 (citing psychological studies
purporting to show that frustrating expectations of fair treatment harms employee
morale).
147. See supra note 83; see also Stacy M. Hickox, Transfer as an Accommodation: Stand-
ards from Discrimination Cases and Theory, 62 ARK. L. REV. 195, 244-47 (2009) (pre-
senting social-science research data to show that subjectivity in hiring and promo-
tion decisions can allow bias to influence those decisions).
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Moreover, though labor's traditional goal of limiting employer discretion
and the antidiscrimination norms underlying the ADA's accommodation re-
quirement are incommensurable, it is worth noting an asymmetry between the
two that militates in favor of privileging the former over the latter, rather than
vice versa, when they conflict. Constraining employer discretion is, as we have
seen, the sine qua non of the labor movement. Unless their discretion is cabined,
employers will continue to be able to treat their employees arbitrarily, thus pre-
venting labor from realizing its goals of augmenting employees' wages and ben-
efits, improving their working conditions, and enhancing their job security. La-
bor, in other words, cannot achieve any of its policy objectives unless it manages
to significantly limit employer discretion.
The ADA's accommodation requirement does not occupy a comparable sta-
tus within the disability-rights movement. While the requirement might be a par-
ticularly direct means of achieving the movement's ambition of integrating peo-
ple with disabilities into the workplace, there are other ways of realizing this
ambition without augmenting employer discretion. Specifically, like Title VII,
the ADA has a provision proscribing employment practices that have a disparate
impact and that cannot be justified by business necessity.' 8 Though this provi-
sion has been largely overshadowed by the accommodation requirement, it could
potentially prove just as effective in increasing employment opportunities for
people with disabilities. Indeed, some disability-law scholars have argued that it
may be more effective in advancing the ADA's mission than the accommodation
requirement, since it would modify jobs and workplace policies more extensively
and thereby uproot entrenched norms that exclude people with disabilities.' 9
And whereas the accommodation requirement enhances employer discretion,
the disparate-impact theory constrains it, since that theory requires employers to
make wholesale accommodations for all their employees rather than retail ac-
commodations for individual employees."o
This is not to deny the considerable obstacles to revitalizing the ADA's dis-
parate-impact theory. Most significant, in the Title VII context, the Supreme
Court has recently cast doubt on both the theory itself and on class actions as the
primary procedural mechanism for bringing disparate-impact challenges."' If
these hurdles are insurmountable, then we will indeed have to confront the con-
flict between the ADA's accommodation requirement and labor's goal of limiting
148. See supra note loi.
149. See Stein & Waterstone, supra note ioi, at 893-921.
150. See supra Subsection I.B.2.
151. See infra note 203 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's decision
in Ricci v. DeStefano); supra note 88 (discussing the Court's decision in Wal-Mart
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes). For a discussion of the other impediments to bringing suc-
cessful ADA disparate-impact challenges, see Nathaniel Garrett, Note, Hendricks-
Robinson as Crowbar: Removing the Certification Bar to Disability-Based Employ-
ment-Discrimination Class Actions, 58 STAN. L. REV. 859, 860 (2005).
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employer discretion. But if they can be overcome in the ADA context, then a gal-
vanized disparate-impact theory might promote the ADA's antidiscrimination
norms at least as well as the accommodation requirement and without incurring
the same costs to labor goals.
Also counting against Barnett is the decision's potential to relegate disabled
individuals to precisely those workplaces that most offend traditional labor goals.
Under Barnett, an ADA plaintiff is more likely to prevail on her accommodation
claim insofar as she seeks an accommodation from a workplace policy that does
not constrain employer discretion. The fewer discretion-constraining policies an
employer has, the more accommodations she will have to make under the ADA.
Although this might incentivize employers to institute more objective workplace
policies, it also might have the perverse effect of consigning disabled employees
to the employers who enjoy the most discretion. Because such employers have
fewer discretion-constraining policies and thus fewer grounds for resisting pro-
posed accommodations as unreasonable, they will, on average, end up having to
accommodate more disabled employees than will employers who enjoy less dis-
cretion. But it is, of course, the unconstrained employers whom organized labor
has traditionally regarded as the greater threat to employees' job security. To the
extent that it still permits disabled individuals to be integrated into the work-
place, Barnett might very well channel them into the worst kinds of workplaces
from the perspective of labor goals.
Our assessment of Barnett will thus also depend on the extent to which we
think labor goals are subject to distributional constraints-in particular, the ex-
tent to which we think it is permissible to promote labor goals for the majority
of workers even at the expense of excluding some identifiable subset of workers
(here, disabled ones) from those very same benefits. Although we cannot elimi-
nate Barnett's potential to channel disabled employees to those employers who
enjoy more discretion, it is worth noting one feature of the ADA that might mit-
igate the more deleterious effects of such channeling. Once the ADA integrates a
disabled employee into any workplace, even one where the employer enjoys con-
siderable discretion, it does not leave the employee wholly subject to the em-
ployer's whim. Recall that the statute forbids employers to "discriminate against
a qualified individual on the basis of disability."'52 And it defines "discrimination"
to include not just failing to make a reasonable accommodation, 5 but also, fol-
lowing Title VII, "limiting, segregating, or classifying a job applicant or employee
in a way that adversely affects the opportunities or status of such applicant or
employee because of [her] disability."15 4 By imposing some restrictions on the
manner in which employers may treat their disabled employees, the ADA's ban
on disability-based disparate treatment protects disabled employees from at least
152. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2006 & Supp. II 2009).
153. Id. § 12112(b)( 5 ) (A).
154. Id. § 12n2(b)(i).
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some particularly egregious forms of arbitrary treatment-even in workplaces
where the employers otherwise have nearly unfettered discretion.'55
Nevertheless, the ADA cannot completely insulate disabled employees from
all the hazards of at-will employment simply by proscribing disparate treatment
because of disability. Thus, Barnett might end up exposing disabled employees to
more of those hazards than they would otherwise face were the ADA's accom-
modation requirement more frequently permitted to trump discretion-con-
straining workplace policies. While there are good reasons to think that this is a
cost worth paying for the sake of safeguarding and promoting discretion-con-
straining policies, it remains a cost nonetheless-a cost proponents of labor goals
must forthrightly acknowledge.
III. REASSIGNMENT AND EMPLOYER DISCRETION
The previous two Parts developed a framework for thinking about the rela-
tionship between labor goals and antidiscrimination norms. Part I identified one
of the labor movement's primary goals-limiting employer discretion to prevent
arbitrary treatment-and demonstrated the ways in which Title VII broadly pro-
motes that goal. Part II then explained how the ADA tends to have the opposite
effect, requiring employers to exercise discretion in implementing ad hoc, case-
by-case accommodations. To illustrate the doctrinal relevance of this framework,
this Part applies it to an issue that continues to divide the federal courts of ap-
peals: whether the ADA can ever require an employer to reassign a disabled em-
ployee to a position in violation of a competitive-assignment policy-that is, a
policy of filling the position with the "most qualified" candidate.
This Part argues that reassignments that violate competitive-assignment pol-
icies can be "reasonable accommodations" within the meaning of the ADA, and
that a Barnett-like presumption against such reassignments is inappropriate. Bar-
nett's rationale seems to warrant a presumption only against accommodations
that undermine discretion-constraining employment policies in the vast majority
of cases, such as accommodations to seniority systems. Unlike the typical senior-
ity system, however, many competitive-assignment policies use vague, subjective
criteria to identify the most qualified candidate, thereby enhancing employer dis-
cretion rather than constraining it. Accordingly, whereas Barnett requires a plain-
tiff to rebut the presumption that a seniority system limits employer discretion,
in a case involving a competitive-assignment policy, a plaintiff should merely
have to make an initial showing that the policy uses vague, subjective criteria to
define merit. By making this showing, the plaintiff reveals the policy to be the
kind that, at least on its face, does little to limit employer discretion and, conse-
quently, stands little to lose from being subjected to the ADA's accommodation
requirement. The burden should then shift to the employer to show that, despite
its use of subjective criteria, the policy actually does constrain employer discre-
155. The same is true, of course, of employees who belong to groups that are protected
under other employment-discrimination statutes, such as Title VII.
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tion, such that departing from it would impose an "undue hardship" in the cir-
cumstances by, say, unsettling employees' legitimate expectations or prompting
nondisabled employees to request additional accommodations.
Although this resolution of the reassignment controversy broadly accords
with proposals made by a number of other scholars, and thus will often yield
similar results in particular cases, it nevertheless differs in fundamental respects.
Some scholars, for example, would also have courts distinguish more carefully
among different kinds of competitive-assignment policies. But they leave the dis-
tinguishing solely to employers attempting to prove their undue-hardship de-
fense, rather than employees attempting to show a proposed accommodation to
be prima facie reasonable. They also suggest few bases of distinction beyond the
degree to which an accommodation disrupts an employer's business opera-
tions." Other scholars have proposed distinguishing between objective and sub-
jective assignment criteria, but they either follow Justice O'Connor's concurrence
in Barnett in deeming objective only those criteria that create legally enforceable
rights'5 7 or focus exclusively on how the distinction might serve antidiscrimina-
tion norms rather than labor goals."' In contrast to these proposals, this Part sit-
uates the reassignment controversy in the broader conflict between labor's goal
of limiting employer discretion and the ADA's commitment to individualized
treatment, offering a more theoretically grounded analysis of competitive-assign-
ment policies and their suitability for accommodations under the ADA.
A. The Reassignment Controversy
The courts of appeals that have confronted the reassignment controversy
fundamentally disagree at the levels of both statutory text and policy. The textual
disagreement centers on the provision of the ADA that identifies "reassignment
to a vacant position" as one possible reasonable accommodation.' 9 On one read-
ing, espoused by the Eighth Circuit (and, until recently, the Seventh Circuit), this
provision would require employers merely to consider the application of a disa-
bled employee seeking reassignment to a particular position as a reasonable ac-
commodation on an equal, nondiscriminatory basis with the applications of
nondisabled employees."'o The reassignment provision, on this view, instructs
156. See, e.g., Cheryl L. Anderson, "Neutral" Employer Policies and the ADA: The Impli-
cations of US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett Beyond Seniority Systems, 51 DRAKE L. REV. 1,
37-43 (2002).
157. See Stephen F. Befort, Reasonable Accommodation and Reassignment Under the
Americans with Disabilities Act: Answers, Questions and Suggested Solutions After
U.S. Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 931, 979-83 (2003).
158. See Hickox, supra note 147, at 244-47.
159. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B) (2006).
16o. See Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 486 F.3d 480 (8th Cir. 2007), cert. dismissed, 552
U.S. 1136 (2oo8); EEOC v. Humiston-Keeling, Inc., 227 F.3d 1024 (7th Cir. 2000),
overruled by EEOC v. United Airlines, Inc., 693 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2012).
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employers that they must consider reassignment to a vacant position as a possible
accommodation before firing a disabled employee-that they have not fully dis-
charged their obligations under the ADA simply by attempting to modify the dis-
abled employee's current position.'"' Contrary to this interpretation, the Tenth
and D.C. Circuits have reasoned that, had Congress intended to require only
equal consideration, it could have explicitly so provided; yet it deliberately chose
the word "reassignment," and "the core word 'assign' implies some active effort
on the part of the employer."' Moreover, because the ADA already contains an-
other provision prohibiting employers from treating the disabled unequally,'63
interpreting the reassignment provision to require only equal consideration
would render that provision superfluous."4
The primary disagreement among the circuits, however, is one of policy. The
Tenth Circuit, for instance, maintains that reading the ADA's reassignment pro-
vision to require only equal consideration would render the provision an
"empty" promise.1es In contrast, the Seventh Circuit once reasoned that a more
expansive reading would threaten to "convert a nondiscrimination statute into a
mandatory preference statute." 6 6 No one, the Seventh Circuit acknowledged,
disputes that "requiring employers to clear away obstacles to hiring the best ap-
plicant for a job, who might be a disabled person or a member of some other
statutorily protected group," falls within the ADA's core mission of guaranteeing
equal employment opportunities for people with disabilities. 6 7 But "requiring
employers to hire inferior (albeit minimally qualified) applicants merely because
they are members of such a group" seems to go well beyond that mission,
amounting to "affirmative action with a vengeance."' 6 The Eighth Circuit has
embraced this argument, declaring that "the ADA is not an affirmative action
statute" and, consequently, that it cannot require employers to prefer disabled
employees over more qualified nondisabled employees. 69
161. Hum iston-Keeling, Inc., 227 F.3d at 1027-28. This argument anticipated the one pro-
pounded by Justice Scalia in his Barnett dissent. See US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535
U.S. 391, 414-15 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
162. Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F-3d 1284, 1304 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc); see Smith v.
Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1164 (loth Cir. 1999) (en banc).
163. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (2006 & Supp. II 2009).
164. Smith, 180 F.3d at 1164-65; Aka, 156 F.3d at 1304.
165. Smith, 180 F.3d at 1167.
166. Humiston-Keeling, Inc., 227 F.3d at 1028; see id. ("[T]he [ADA] is not a mandatory
preference act.").
167. Id.
168. Id. at 1028-29.
169. Huber v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 486 F.3d 480, 484 (8th Cir. 2007), cert. dismissed,
552 U.S. 1136 (2008).
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This "affirmative action" rhetoric loses some of its force once we recognize
the various limits that the ADA and the EEOC's enforcement guidelines impose
on the reassignment duty. As summarized by the Tenth Circuit, these limits in-
clude the following: an employer need not create a new position for a disabled
employee seeking reassignment; the position to which the disabled employee
wishes to be reassigned must be "vacant," which will not be the case if it is cur-
rently occupied by another employee or if another employee has a contractual or
seniority-based right to it; the disabled employee must be minimally "qualified"
for the position within the meaning of the ADA; reassignment is not required if
it would constitute a promotion; and reassignment, like any other accommoda-
tion, must not impose an "undue hardship" on the operation of the employer's
business."1o Nevertheless, despite these limits, to adopt the Tenth and D.C. Cir-
cuits' position-to be willing in principle to require an employer to reassign a
disabled employee to a position in violation of its competitive-assignment pol-
icy-would be to impose a significant obligation on employers.
B. Balancing Labor Goals and Antidiscrimination Norms in Reassignment
Cases
Whatever the intrinsic merits of each position espoused by the courts of ap-
peals, neither can withstand the Supreme Court's decision in Barnett unscathed.
On the one hand, the Eighth Circuit professes (as the Seventh Circuit once pro-
fessed) a desire to prevent the ADA from becoming a "mandatory preference
statute" or a form of "affirmative action." And yet, despite the Eighth Circuit's
protestation that the Seventh Circuit's prior position was "bolstered by" Bar-
nett,7 ' Barnett actually repudiated it. The Court declared that "preferences will
sometimes prove necessary to achieve the Act's basic equal opportunity goal";
consequently, "[t]he simple fact that an accommodation would provide a 'pref-
erence'-in the sense that it would permit the worker with a disability to violate
a rule that others must obey-cannot, in and of itself, automatically show that the
accommodation is not 'reasonable."'" The Seventh Circuit recently recognized
as much, overruling its prior precedent in light of Barnett and adopting the Tenth
and D.C. Circuits' position.'73
On the other hand, the Tenth and D.C. Circuits' position seems to imply that
reassignment in violation of a competitive-assignment policy will always be rea-
sonable, at least in principle, regardless of how the policy actually identifies the
"most qualified" candidate. In adopting that position, the Seventh Circuit has
170. Smith, 180 F.3d at 1170. For further exposition of these limits, see id. at 1170-78.
171. Huber, 486 F.3d at 484.
172. US Airways, Inc. v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391, 397, 398 (2002).
173. See EEOC v. United Airlines, Inc., 693 F-3d 760, 764-65 (7 th Cir. 2012), cert. denied,
133 S. Ct. 2734 (2013).
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drawn the same lesson.7 4 Barnett's rationale, however, demands closer scrutiny
of such policies to determine whether they actually constrain employer discre-
tion, such that employees form expectations of fair, predictable treatment.
Therefore, to assess the appropriateness of an accommodation that would
require an employer to reassign a disabled employee in violation of the em-
ployer's competitive-assignment policy, courts should consider whether the pol-
icy uses objective or subjective criteria to identify the most qualified candidate.
In particular, an ADA plaintiff seeking reassignment should bear the initial bur-
den of showing that the employer's competitive-assignment policy uses subjec-
tive criteria, rendering it the kind of policy that, at least on its face, affords the
employer significant discretion and consequently engenders few expectations
among employees of fair, predictable treatment. This would mean that the ac-
commodation would be reasonable "in the run of cases."
At that point, the burden should shift to the employer to show that, despite
using subjective criteria, the policy nonetheless cabins employer discretion and
that the proposed reassignment would consequently impose an "undue hard-
ship" on its business operations in the particular circumstances.' 75 Although the
undue-hardship defense has traditionally been assumed to contemplate only an
accommodation's financial costs and logistical hurdles, employers should be al-
lowed to show that the accommodation will augment their discretion as well; in-
deed, from a labor-goals perspective, they should be encouraged to do so. To
make such a showing, an employer might argue that the accommodation will
unsettle employees' legitimate expectations or that it will prompt nondisabled
employees to request additional accommodations. Both of these consequences
would further erode discretion-constraining policies and thus enhance employ-
ers' ability to treat their employees arbitrarily. By allowing employers to assert
such considerations as a defense to proposed accommodations, we can reinforce
the incentives Barnett creates for employers to institute and follow objective
workplace policies.
At neither step of the foregoing analysis should courts equate "objective" se-
lection criteria strictly with legally binding ones.'17 Even if a selection policy is not
legally enforceable, it can still be objective in the sense that it significantly con-
strains employer discretion-a fact Barnett recognized in the context of seniority
systems. 7 So restricting the definition of "objective" criteria would be especially
174. See id. at 764, 765 f-3.
175. Cf Barnett, 535 U.S. at 401-02 (endorsing a burden-shifting framework whereby the
plaintiff first shows that the requested accommodation seems reasonable "on its
face" and the employer then shows that the accommodation would impose an "un-
due hardship" in the circumstances).
176. Contra Befort, supra note 157, at 979-83 (deeming "objective" only those selection
policies that create legally enforceable rights).
177. Barnett, 535 U.S. at 394.
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unfortunate given the inexorable decline in the number of unionized work-
places,"'8 which tend to have the most legally enforceable policies, in the form of
collective-bargaining agreements. If we want to promote the labor goal of curb-
ing arbitrary treatment for all employees, both unionized and nonunionized (and
Barnett suggests we should), then we must attend to the details of employers'
selection procedures, without relying on overbroad proxies.
To be sure, once we move beyond the notion of legal enforceability, the dis-
tinction between objective and subjective selection criteria becomes vague. At
one extreme, an employer might use numeric criteria, such as the number of
words an employee can type per minute, or a score on a professionally developed
test-measures of merit that leave the employer with almost no discretion and
that should generally not be subverted by the discretionary accommodation de-
cision required by the ADA. At the other extreme, an employer might specify no
criteria at all, trusting the assignment decision to a manager's "gut feeling" about
the candidates. Because such a policy already leaves the employer with nearly un-
fettered discretion, subjecting the employer to the ADA's accommodation re-
quirement will neither enhance the employer's discretion further nor frustrate
employees' expectations of fair treatment.
Between these two extremes lies a vast range of competitive-assignment pol-
icies, including those that specify rather rigorous minimum qualifications for the
position but then leave the ultimate assignment decision to the employer's dis-
cretion. For example, under the assignment policy at issue in the earlier Seventh
Circuit decision considered in the previous Section, the employer's director of
human resources would first screen the applicants for an accounting position,
identifying the strongest ones based on fairly objective criteria, such as education,
accounting experience, and math skills.'79 A supervisor would then interview the
screened applicants, ultimately choosing one for the position based on her sub-
jective sense of who was the best among them.so In cases involving such policies,
the framework developed in this Article suggests that reassignment will often be
a reasonable accommodation, since the accommodation decision will often be no
more subjective than the employer's discretionary judgment regarding who
among a group of minimally qualified candidates is the "most qualified.""'
178. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
179. See EEOC v. Humiston-Keeling, Inc., 54 F. Supp. 2d 798, 804-05 (N.D. 111. 1999).
180. See id.
181. This assumes, of course, that the interview stage is an arbitrary process, simply be-
cause it employs subjective criteria. If an interview process employs more objective
procedures, such as multiple interviewers and well-defined rubrics, then a disabled
employee will typically not be able to meet her burden of showing the reasonable-
ness of an accommodation that would disrupt or bypass that process. And even
when an interview process uses subjective criteria, the employer will still be able to
attempt to show as part of its undue-hardship defense that the process nevertheless
limits its discretion in practice.
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Given the significant variation among competitive-assignment policies, a
presumption of reasonableness in favor of accommodations that violate such
policies is inappropriate. But so too is a Barnett-style presumption of unreason-
ableness."' Whereas seniority systems almost always cabin employer discretion
and therefore engender expectations among employees of fair and predictable
treatment, a significant proportion of competitive-assignment policies leave em-
ployer discretion relatively unconstrained. Indeed, many such policies are de-
signed precisely to preserve employer discretion.81 Disabled employees should
thus be permitted to demonstrate that their employers' competitive-assignment
policies are the kinds of policies that, on their face, do little to curb decisionmak-
ing discretion, and, consequently, that would not be significantly undermined by
the ADA's accommodation requirement.
Though we might worry that courts lack the institutional capacity to scruti-
nize employers' selection policies, or that such an inquiry is unmanageable, this
concern should not be dispositive. For one thing, as a doctrinal matter, Barnett's
holding and rationale require a more nuanced approach to evaluating the discre-
tion-constraining effects of employment policies (and thus the "reasonableness"
of violating them in the name of the ADA's accommodation requirement).
Moreover, asking courts to examine employers' selection policies and to distin-
guish between objective and subjective criteria is not asking them to engage in an
enterprise that is completely alien to them. As we have seen,184 in the context of
disparate-impact challenges under Title VII, courts regularly distinguish among
numeric, nonnumeric (but still objective), and subjective selection criteria, and
the EEOC has developed elaborate guidelines for evaluating each kind. The same
is true for challenges to private employers' affirmative-action programs.'' To im-
plement this Article's proposed solution to the reassignment controversy, courts
need not perform any inquiries that they are not already performing in other
employment-discrimination cases.
Indeed, courts also regularly perform such inquiries in assessing the reason-
ableness of accommodations under the ADA itself. For example, to determine
whether it is reasonable to require an employer to modify its attendance policy
in order to accommodate a disabled employee, courts focus on the degree to
which the policy constrains the employer's discretion in setting its employees'
182. But see Anderson, supra note 156, at 34-37 (observing that, when read broadly, Bar-
nett creates a presumption that any accommodation that would violate a neutral
employer policy is presumptively unreasonable).
183. See Befort, supra note 157, at 981 (noting that such policies often "vest subjective
decision-making authority in the employer"); see also ELKOURI & ELKOURI, supra
note 49, at 845 (noting that employers include "sufficient ability" clauses in collec-
tive-bargaining agreements in order to preserve discretion to select those applicants
they deem most qualified).
184. See supra Subsection I.B.2.
185. See Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Note, Grutter at Work: A Title VII Critique of Constitu-
tional Affirmative Action, 115 YALE L.J. 1408,1424-33 (2006).
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work schedules. Thus, when an attendance policy requires regular attendance or
full-time work or sets a particular start time, courts usually deem compliance
with the policy to be an "essential job function" and hold either that the disabled
employee is not "qualified" for the position' or that altering the schedule would
not be a "reasonable" accommodation.'8 7 When, by contrast, the attendance pol-
icy permits the employer to set flexible work schedules, courts will usually hold a
modified work schedule to be a reasonable accommodation."' Assessing com-
petitive-assignment policies according to the framework outlined in this Section
would little complicate the already fact-intensive inquiries that courts must un-
dertake in assessing the reasonableness of other proposed accommodations.!a"
Finally, this Section's argument might seem to imply that any policy that sig-
nificantly limits employer discretion should trump the ADA's accommodation
requirement, that employers should never be required to violate neutral, discre-
tion-constraining policies in order to accommodate a disabled employee. Such
an implication would indeed be unacceptable, for some of the most typical, un-
objectionable accommodations under the ADA require employers to exercise
considerable discretion.' But as we have seen, not all policies that incidentally
constrain employer discretion are meant to advance the traditional labor goal of
curbing arbitrary treatment in the workplace. On the contrary, rather than at-
tempting to eliminate all employer discretion, organized labor has focused on
certain core areas of employer decisionmaking, such as hiring and firing employ-
ees, making job assignments and promotions, and setting wages; hence the
NLRA's treatment of these areas as "mandatory" subjects of collective bargain-
ing.'9' It is in these areas that organized labor has perceived the greatest threat of
arbitrary treatment and has sought most to cabin employer discretion.
Organized labor's focus on these core areas of employer decisionmaking
should inform the application of the ADA's accommodation requirement. In
particular, if a requested accommodation implicates a policy governing one of
186. See, e.g., Schierhoff v. Glaxosmithkline Consumer Healthcare, L.P., 444 F.3d 961,
966 (8th Cir. 20o6) (equating an employee's non-attendance with an "inability to
perform [the] job" for purposes of the Missouri Human Rights Act, a state statute
that parallels many of the ADA's requirements).
187. See, e.g., Mulloy v. Acushnet Co., 460 F.3d 141, 153 (1st Cir. 20o6).
188. See, e.g., EEOC v. Convergys Mgmt. Grp., Inc., 491 F.3d 790, 796-97 (8th Cir. 2007).
189. State courts employ a similar kind of analysis to determine whether the provisions
of employee handbooks constitute binding contracts. See, e.g., Anderson v. Douglas
& Lomason Co., 540 N.W.2d 277, 286 (Iowa 1995) (outlining a "highly fact-intensive
inquiry").
190. Cf Anderson, supra note 156, at 39 (noting that the vast majority of accommoda-
tions require employers to depart from "neutral" workplace policies); Long, supra
note 137, at 896 (same).
191. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
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these areas-an area that, in a unionized workplace,'9 would be a mandatory
subject of collective bargaining-the ADA's accommodation requirement should
trump the policy (subject to the "undue-hardship" defense) only if the employer
already exercises significant discretion in that area. Outside the core areas of em-
ployer decisionmaking, by contrast, the ADA's accommodation requirement
should more frequently trump neutral employment policies (again, subject to the
"undue-hardship" defense), regardless of the degree to which the policies con-
strain employers' discretion. Enhancing employer discretion in these non-core
areas poses little risk of facilitating the kind of arbitrary treatment permitted by
the at-will rule.193
192. It bears emphasis that this Article's proposed solution to the reassignment contro-
versy is in no way limited to unionized workplaces governed by collective-bargain-
ing agreements. Once again, an ever-shrinking share of the workforce belongs to
unions. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. Accordingly, a workplace policy
counts as "objective" so long as it constrains employer discretion, regardless of
whether it is enshrined in a collective-bargaining agreement. And such a policy falls
within a "core area" of labor's concern so long as it would be a mandatory subject
of collective bargaining were it instituted in a unionized workplace, even if it is in
fact instituted in a nonunionized workplace. Putting these two strands together, a
workplace policy should generally trump the ADA's accommodation requirement
if and only if it (i) is objective and (2) is the kind of policy that would be a manda-
tory subject of collective bargaining in a unionized workplace, irrespective of the
type of workplace in which it is actually instituted.
193. One implication of this Article's proposed resolution of the reassignment contro-
versy is that it renders the ADA's accommodation requirement vulnerable to
changing employment practices. This is true because, as employers adopt more ob-
jective workplace policies, fewer accommodations will be reasonable. Consider the
fact that many employers have begun to "objectify" previously subjective employ-
ment practices. For example, whereas employers have traditionally relied on their
own subjective judgments regarding applicants' personalities, many now adminis-
ter professionally developed personality tests, which purport to measure personal-
ity and character traits, such as honesty and integrity, based on applicants' answers
to objective questions. See, e.g., Soroka v. Dayton Hudson Corp., i Cal. Rptr. 2d 77
(1993), superseded, 862 P.2d 148 (Cal. 1993) (discussing a privacy challenge to a per-
sonality test used by Target Stores). From the perspective of labor goals, this devel-
opment is potentially salutary; because personality tests replace employers' intui-
tive impressions of applicants' personalities with a more objective assessment, they
limit employer discretion (to the extent, of course, that employers actually honor
the results). But, in so doing, they mitigate one potential source of arbitrary treat-
ment and thus, per this Article's framework, largely insulate one significant em-
ployment practice from the ADA's accommodation requirement.
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CONCLUSION
The ADA reassignment controversy is not the only issue in employment-dis-
crimination law that pits labor goals against antidiscrimination norms. Some of
Title VII's less central aspects also provoke the conflict, even if core cases of dis-
parate treatment and disparate impact largely do not. Take the Pregnancy Dis-
crimination Act of 1978, which amended Title VII to prohibit discrimination be-
cause of pregnancy.194 Does this prohibition require employers to provide "light
duty" to their pregnant employees?'9 5 To accommodate mothers currently breast-
feeding their infants?'9' To allow mothers to work part time? 97 Beyond the PDA,
numerous employment-law scholars have advocated the adoption of more flexi-
ble workplace policies so that all employees-but particularly women-might
enjoy a greater degree of work/life balance.98 Are such proposals advisable? All
of these debates turn partly on the desirability of having employers craft individ-
ualized exemptions to generally applicable, discretion-constraining workplace
194. 42 U.S.C. § 20ooe(k) (2006) (providing that " [t]he terms 'because of sex' or 'on the
basis of sex' include, but are not limited to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy,
childbirth, or related medical conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, child-
birth, or related medical conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-
related purposes, including receipt of benefits under fringe benefit programs, as
other persons not so affected but similar in their ability or inability to work").
195. Compare Urbano v. Cont'l Airlines, Inc., 138 F.3d 204 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that
an employer did not have to provide pregnant employees light duty if it did not
provide that same accommodation to other employees injured off the job), with
EEOC v. Horizon/CMS Healthcare Corp., 220 F.3d 1184, 1199-2000 (ioth Cir. 2000)
(holding the opposite).
196. Compare Fejes v. Gilpin Ventures, Inc., 960 F. Supp. 1487, 1491-92 (D. Colo. 1997)
(holding that an employer need not permit a breastfeeding employee to work part
time), with Fortier v. U.S. Steel Grp., No. 01-CV-2029, 2002 WL 1797796, at *3 (W.D.
Pa. June 4, 2002) (holding that an employee had stated a claim under the PDA by
alleging that she was subject to an adverse employment action after she expressed
an intention to breastfeed).
197. See, e.g., Gleklen v. Democratic Cong. Campaign Comm., 199 F.3d 1365 (D.C. Cir.
2000) (holding that an employer did not violate the PDA by firing an employee
who asked to work part-time in order to care for her child, when the employer put
forward reasonable and nondiscriminatory reasons for requiring the employee to
work full time).
198. See, e.g., Rachel Arnow-Richman, Incenting Flexibility: The Relationship Between
Public Law and Voluntary Action in Enhancing Work/Life Balance, 42 CONN. L. REV.
1081 (2010); Deborah L. Rhode, Balanced Lives, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 834 (2002); Vicki
Schultz, Life's Work, 1oo COLUM. L. REV. 1881 (2000); Michelle A. Travis, Telecom-
muting: The Escher Stairway of Work/Family Conflict, 55 ME. L. REV. 261 (2003). But
see Jessica A. Clarke, Beyond Equality? Against the Universal Turn in Workplace Pro-
tections, 86 IND. L.J. 1219 (2011) (arguing that universal protections designed to pro-
mote work/life balance might undermine antidiscrimination protections for disad-
vantaged social groups, particularly women).
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policies-a facet of the debates that employment-law scholars have largely over-
looked and that a focus on labor goals helps to illuminate.
More generally, a number of scholars have touted the ADA's model of indi-
vidualized treatment and advocated extending it to other areas of employment-
discrimination law, including Title VII.'99 Other scholars have argued that all
work-capable individuals who require a reasonable accommodation to be able to
work should be eligible for the ADA's accommodation requirement."oo In light
of this Article's analysis of the ADA's accommodation requirement, we have good
reason to question such proposals. For we have now seen that implementing the
ADA's vision of individualized treatment carries a considerable cost: augmenting
employers' decisionmaking discretion and thus increasing the risk of arbitrary
treatment in the workplace. Faced with this prospect, nondisabled employees are
likely to resent attempts by their employers to accord individualized treatment to
their disabled coworkers, thus undermining employee solidarity. Nonarbitrary
treatment and employee solidarity are the benefits that the labor movement has
traditionally sought to secure for workers, yet these are also the very benefits that
individualized treatment jeopardizes. If the ADA model entails such costs for la-
bor goals, then we should be reluctant to extend that model to other areas of
employment-discrimination law. At the very least, we should be cognizant of
these costs before trading the categories of disparate treatment and disparate im-
pact for a retail regime of individualized accommodations.
To be clear, this Article should not be taken as a categorical condemnation
of the vision of individualized treatment underlying the ADA's accommodation
requirement. This vision remains an attractive one in many respects, and it can
be implemented to a considerable degree without undermining labor goals. For
one thing, we have seen that according employees individualized treatment does
not create a significant risk of arbitrariness when the treatment departs from cer-
tain kinds of generally applicable workplace policies. This is particularly true for
policies that, in a unionized workplace, would not be mandatory subjects of col-
lective bargaining, which organized labor has regarded as less essential to con-
straining employer discretion."0o
In addition, individualized treatment can be implemented in more or less
objective ways, and the more objective the means of implementation, the less
discretion the employer must exercise. For example, rather than attempt to de-
termine whether a particular individual meets a generalized statutory definition
199. See, e.g., Diller, supra note 7, at 47 ("If differential and individualized treatment is
necessary for the establishment of equal opportunity for people with disabilities, it
may also be necessary for other groups, including women and minorities."); Karlan
& Rutherglen, supra note 14, at 40-41 ("The fact that traditional prohibitions on
discrimination and innovative forms of affirmative action can coexist under the
ADA suggests that the same may be true for employment discrimination law more
generally.").
200. See, e.g., Stein et al., supra note 104.
201. See supra notes 53, 193 and accompanying text.
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of "disability," the Social Security Administration employs a detailed matrix-like
"grid" to assess individuals' ability to perform various jobs and thus their eligi-
bility for disability insurance.20 2 We could imagine a similarly rigid regime for
determining whether a person is disabled for purposes of the ADA's accommo-
dation requirement, which might limit the discretion employers must exercise to
implement the requirement and thus any attendant risk of arbitrary treatment.
Of course, rendering individualized treatment more objective in this manner also
makes the treatment less individualized; a "grid" will be under- and over-inclu-
sive in many respects, thus forgoing some of the benefits of a more tailored ap-
proach. But by recognizing that individualized treatment is a matter of degree,
and that we can realize many of the benefits of such treatment without having to
afford employers broad discretion to implement it, we might strike a better bal-
ance between antidiscrimination norms and labor goals.
Notwithstanding these qualifications, it remains the case that the ADA's vi-
sion of individualized treatment fundamentally conflicts with organized labor's
goal of cabining employer discretion. A commitment to individualized treatment
arguably lies at the heart of all of antidiscrimination law. But whereas disparate-
treatment antidiscrimination norms seek to realize the promise of individualized
treatment indirectly, by excluding as bases of decision those characteristics that
are most likely to call attention to a person's membership in some socially disfa-
vored group, the ADA's accommodation requirement takes that promise more
literally, directly mandating individualized treatment.
Between these two strategies lies the theory of disparate impact, which effec-
tively imposes an accommodation requirement on employers but implements
the requirement at the level of groups rather than individuals. While this aggre-
gate focus precludes the precise tailoring that the ADA's accommodation re-
quirement allows, it also disfavors ad hoc exceptions to generally applicable pol-
icies and thus avoids enhancing employer discretion. Thus, amid trenchant
criticism of the disparate-impact theory-from judges, as well as scholars at both
ends of the ideological spectrum 2 03-this Article provides an additional reason to
retain it. As we confront new forms of discrimination and begin to develop new
antidiscrimination norms in response, the disparate-impact model might offer a
promising alternative to the ADA's model of individualized treatment as a way
of accommodating difference in the workplace without subverting labor goals.
202. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404-1503-1511 & app. 2 (2012). For more on the contrast between
disability determinations under the ADA and those under the Social Security Act,
see Frank S. Ravitch, Balancing Fundamental Disability Policies: The Relationship
Between the Americans with Disabilities Act and Social Security Disability, i GEO. J.
ON FIGHTING POVERTY 240, 248 (1994).
203. See, e.g., Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 594-96 (2009) (Scalia, J., concurring);
Larry Alexander, Disparate Impact: Fairness or Efficiency?, So SAN DIEGO L. REV.
(forthcoming 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstract id=2139753; Selmi, supra note 88.
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